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VIRGINIA LAW AND
THE COMMERCIAL PAPER ARTICLE OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WILFRED

J. Rn'z*

I. INTRODUCTION
A.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Scope. Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code' covers Commercial Paper, while Article 8 deals with Investment Securities. From
the nomenclature it would appear that a functional division has been
effected, but this is only partially true. The definition of a "security"
is functional and includes bearer bonds, registered bonds, certificates
of stock and other types of investment paper. Commercial paper, on
the other hand, is not defined and whether or not it falls within the
scope of the Article depends on its form; in effect, notes, including
certificates of deposit, checks, and drafts are covered. That these instruments may be used in "noncommercial" transactions seems to be
recognized, but nevertheless the instruments are treated as commercial paper. Money and documents of title are excluded from the
Article on Commercial Paper.
Bonds, which were covered by the NIL, are excluded from the
Article on Commercial Paper. A writing which is a "security" as defined in Article 8 and also meets the formal requirements of Article 3
I.

*A.B. 1938, Washington and Lee University; LL.B. 1950, University of Richmond; LL.M. 1951, Harvard University. Assistant Director Research, 1938-42, Industrial Director, 1946-50, Virginia State Chamber of Commerce; Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest College, 1952-53; Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, 19 5 3-date. Member of Virginia and Massachusetts Bars.
'The Official Draft is discussed in:
Andrews, Should Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code be adopted in Ohio.
14 Ohio St. L. J. 32-56 (1953).

Britton, Formal Requisites of Negotiability-The Negotiable Instruments Law
Compared with the Proposed Commercial Code, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1-33 (1953);
Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and Article 3

2

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XII

is excluded from Article 3 and governed solely by Article 8.2 Thus,
although the division is based partly on function and partly on form,
when they overlap the functional division controls.
By way of contrast, Article 3 on Commercial Paper and Article
4 on Bank Deposits and Collections are not mutually exclusive. Items,
or instruments, within the scope of both Articles are subject to the
provisions of both, but in the event of conflict the provisions of the
Article on Bank Deposits and Collections govern. 3
An instrument, as when it is used as collateral, may be within the
scope of both the Article on Commercial Paper and the Article on
Secured Transactions. Both Articles are then applicable, but in case
4
of conflict Article 9 on Secured Transactions controls.
2. Instrument-Definition. UCC 3-102(1) states that, "In this
Article unless the context otherwise requires... (e) 'Instrument' means
a negotiable instrument." Unfortunately, in order to avoid redundancy, bad grammar, or inconsistency, the context almost always requires that a different definition of the word "instrument" be used. 5
ing of a "negotiable" and of a "non-negotiable" instrument.
As matter of fact, by virtue of UCC 3-8o5, which brings non-negotiable
instruments within the scope of the Article, the context with few exceptions requires that the word instrument be given the dual mean-

of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 153-171 (1953); Holder in Due
Course, 49 Northw. U. L. Rev. 417-457 (1954).
Finklestein, Article Three-Commercial Paper, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 812-32 (1953).
Hill, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code would Affect the
Law of Negotiable Instruments in Oregon, 32 Ore. L. Rev. 97-155 (1953) (discussion
of Part 1);Tyler, Id., 33 Ore. L. Rev. 41-57 (1953) (discussion of Part 2); Marsh
Id., 34 Ore. L. Rev. 33-54 (1954) (discussion of Part 3).
Symposium, 17 Albany L. Rev. i, 65-80 (1953).
The Final Text Edition, November 1951, is discussed in:
Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, [1952] Wisc.
L. Rev. 230-64.
The Spring 195o Draft is discussed in:
Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article Three and the
Negotiable Instruments Law, 3o Nebr. L. Rev. 531-58 (1951)Cosway, Innovations in Article Three and Four of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 284-307 (1951).
Leary, Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper in the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 354-387 (1949).
Palmer, Negotiable .Instruments under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
Mich. L. Rev. 255-310 (i950).
2UCC 3-103(1) and 8-102(i)(b).
3UCC 4-102 (1) and UCC 3-103(2).
4UCC 3-103(2) and Comment, Point 2, and UCC 9-io2()(a).
'E.g., "A 'negotiable' instrument otherwise negotiable..." UCC 3-113. "The
negotiability of a 'negotiable' instrument is not affected by.. ." UCO 3-112 and
3-114.
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3. Instruments "Within this Article."6 Whereas under the NIL an
instrument "to be negotiable" must conform to certain requirements,
under the UCC "any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this
Article" must conform to the listed requirements. 7 The NIL, thus,
lays down an exclusive test of negotiability,8 while the UCC leaves
open the possibility that some writings may be made negotiable by other
statutes or by judicial decision. 9
4. Instruments Not Payable to Order or to Bearer.10 By virtue of
UCC 3-8o5 the provisions of the Article are extended to one type of
paper which is not negotiable. This section reads as follows:
"This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do not
preclude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this
Article but which is not payable to order or to bearer, except that
there can be no holder in due course of such an instrument."
and according to the Comment:
"This section covers the 'non-negotiable instrument.' As it has
been used by most courts, this term has been a technical one of
art. It does not refer to a writing, such as a note containing an
express condition, which is not negotiable and is entirely outside of the scope of this Article and to be treated as a simple
contract... The typical example is the check reading merely
'Pay John Doe.'... Commercial and banking practice treats
it as a check, and a long line of decisions before and after the
original Act have made it clear that it is subject to the law merchant as distinguished from ordinary contract law. Although the
Negotiable Instruments Law has been held by its terms not to
apply to such 'non-negotiable instruments' it has been recognized as a codification and restatement of the law merchant, and
has in fact been applied to them by analogy.... In short, the
'non-negotiable instrument' is treated as a negotiable instrument, so far as its form permits. Since it lacks words of negotiability there can be no holder in due course of such an instrument, and any provision of any section of this Article peculiar to
a holder in due course cannot apply to it. With this exception,
such instruments are covered by all sections of this Article."
This section would seem to create new classifications of instruGUCC 3-1040). See Sherman and Feeney, An Examination of the Negotiability
Concept of the Uniform Commercial Code, [1953] Wash. U. L. Q. 296-31o (discusses
official draft).
7Cf. UCC 3-104(1) with NIL 1 (Va. § 6-353).
WManhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 15o N. E. 594 (1926); Enoch v. Brandon,
249 N. Y. 263, 164

N. E. 45 (1928).

OUCC 3-1o4, Comment, Point i.
"-Note, Liabilities of Transferor of Non-Negotiable Instruments under the Proposed Commercial Code, 98 U. of Pa. L. Rev.

213-23

(195o).
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ments, that is, the "non-negotiable" and the "not negotiable" instruments. The "non-negotiable" instrument misses negotiability only
for lack of words of negotiability-order or bearer. The "not negotiable" instrument misses negotiability for some other reason as by
containing an unauthorized term. This new classification may, at first
at least, cause confusion in determining the applicability of precedents
in which the court did not advert to such a distinction. Moreover, somewhat incongruously, the section brings into the scope of the Article
instruments which the parties intend to be non-negotiable or not negotiable by omission of words of negotiability. Yet, instruments which
the parties may intend to be negotiable, but are not so because of the
inclusion of an unauthorized term, for instance, are entirely excluded
from the Article. The merits for the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the other are not made clear in the Comment.
While the text of the Article and the Comment make clear there
cannot be a holder in due course of a "non-negotiable" instrument
under Article 3, it does not follow that there cannot be under another
Article, such as Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections. There appears to be no restriction on the nature of the "item" of which a bank
can be a holder in due course.
5. Parole Evidence Rule. The borderline between negotiability
and non-negotiability is also affected by Section -i9ig which reads as
follows:
"Section 3-1 ig. Other Writings Affecting Instrument.
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any
transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected by any other written agreement executed as a part of the
same transaction, except that a holder in due course is not affected by any limitation of his rights arising out of the separate
written agreement if he had no notice of the limitation when he
took the instrument.
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of
an instrument."
This is one of the few instances in the Article in which the words
"obligor" and "obligee" are used," and they are not defined. Whether
or not the choice of words is significant is not evident. If not, the words
12
might be used to advantage in other sections.
The section only relates to "written agreements," so that the strong
2UCC 3-802 is another example.
22
See UCC 3-8o3, which uses the words "plaintiff" and "defendant" and UCC
3-6o6(1)(a) which uses the phrase "against whom the party has ... a right of recourse."
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position taken by the Virginia court against the admissibility of evidence respecting oral agreements, as that the instrument may be discharged in a manner different from that provided in the instrument,
is not affected.' 3 According to the Comment, the section makes applicable to negotiable instruments "the ordinary rule that writings executed
as a part of the same transaction are to be read together as a single
agreement."14
According to the Comment if an instrument, "is negotiable in
itself a purchaser without notice of a separate writing is in no way
affected by it."'1 The section makes no provision for actions involving
accommodation parties. Since an accommodation party is not the
obligor, nor the obligee or any transferee, it seems inevitable that confusion will arise under the UCC when the parole evidence rule is invoked in an action involving such a party.
The thought that a holder in due course may have notice of a
limitation on his rights and still be a holder in due course is somewhat difficult to fathom. According to the Comment' 6 if the purchaser
takes the instrument with notice of a defense or claim, as that the
instrument is a sham, he cannot be a holder in due course. But if he
takes with notice from the separate agreement that under certain conditions the note shall be extended for one year, he may be a holder in
due course, but he takes the instrument subject to the limitation. The
distinction would seem to be between a "complete" defense, under
which no recovery can be had, and a "partial" defense, under which
recovery according to the terms of the instrument cannot be had. The
latter is a "limitation" and not a defense. Does this definition of
"defense" as meaning only a "complete defense" carry over into the
sections on holding in due course, in which the words "any defense
against or claim to" the instrument are used?17 Apparently it does in
order to make UCC 3-ii9 effective. But the natural connotation of

the words in the section defining a holder in due course has been
greatly changed. "Any defense" means "complete defense." Is this
definition (derived from the Comment to UCC 3-119) in conflict with

UCC 3-304, which provides that "The purchaser has notice of a claim
or defense if... the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any
"Rector v. Hancock,

127

Va. io,

102

S. E. 663

(1920).

21UCC 3-119, Comment, Point 3.
"UCC 3-119, Comment, Point 5, and see Comment, Point 2.
UUCC 3-119, Comment, Point 4.

'"UCC 3-302(1)(c).
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party is voidable in whole or in part...." Or is an obligation voidable
in part something more than a limitation and less than a defense?
Although the thought will be developed more fully later, attention
should be called to the second section of UCC 3-119 which provides
that a separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instrument. When a holder with notice of limitations on his rights can
still be a holder in due course, but subject to those limitations, what
is the peculiar significance of "the negotiability of an instrument"?
Professor Britton has criticized this section on the ground that an
"entire mortgage, conditional sale contract or other writing goes into
the note for all purposes except that none of its terms can be used for
the purpose of destroying negotiability of the note."' 8 Furthermore, "by
permitting the siphoning of all the terms of the securing instrument
into the note, the holder gets the benefit of any and all rules of the
law of negotiable paper which perchance are of a higher order than
the corresponding rules in the law applicable to the securing instrument. There is no reason why the holder should have such a benefit."'19
Professor Britton concludes that this section, along with 3-805, and the
phrase "within this Article" in UCC 3-104 should be striken from the
UCC because they obscure the boundary line between negotiable and
non-negotiable instruments, the maintenance of which he considers a
20
fundamental legal policy.
6. Exclusive or By Analogy Interpretation.One of the somewhat
baffling aspects of the Article on Commercial Paper is its alternative
contractive and expansive effect. As has already been pointed out, UCC
3-104, 3-119, 3-805 tend to expand the concept of negotiability. On
the other hand other sections are contractive; UCC 3 -1o4 (i)(b) provides that an instrument to be negotiable must contain an unconditional promise or order "and no other promise, order, obligation or
power," and UCC 3-112 is apparently an exclusive listing of the additional obligations the instrument may carry. In line with this contractive effect is the omission of NIL lo (Va. Sec. 6-362) under which
the precise language of the NIL did not need to be followed, if there
was a clear indication of an intention to conform to the requirements
of the NIL.
Even more confusing, however, is the question of whether individual sections are exclusive or are to be extended by analogy. Without
IsBritton, supra, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1,5.

20Id.
Id.
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any indication thereof in the text, the Comment to some sections
states that it is not exclusive and is to be extended by analogy2 ' while
22
other Comments are stated to be exclusive.
7. Rephrasing of NIL. The language of the NIL has been extensively rephrased in the UCC, even when no change in substance is
intended. Categorical statements that no change has been made are
impossible, even though the UCC draftsmen state in the Comment that
no change is intended. This can be illustrated by considering whether
a bona fide transferee after maturity of a negotiable instrument is subject to set-off by the maker against a prior party.
Under the first sentence of NIL 58 (Va. Sec. 6-41o) it is provided
that:
"In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due
course a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as
if it were non-negotiable."
The language of UCC 3 -3 o6(b) is as follows:
"Unless he has the right of a holder in due course any person takes the instrument subject to...
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an
action on a simple contract; ... "

The explanation for the change, in its entirety, contained in
Comment, Point 3, to this section in the UCC is:
"Paragraph (b) restates the first sentence of the original Section 58."
Evidently the UCC draftsmen did not have the benefit of the
Virginia court's exhaustive analysis in Stegal v. Union Bank and
Federal Trust Co., 23 of the question of whether a post-maturity bona
fide purchaser for value of a negotiable note from the payee takes the
instrument free of set-offs which the maker has against the payee at
the time of the transfer or subsequently acquired.
The Virginia court concluded that under the Law Merchant such
a purchaser would take the instrument free of set-off. "He takes the
instrument subject only to equities attaching to or inherent in the
instrument itself at the time of the transfer, and equities arising out of
the transaction giving rise to the instrument which exists (though they
may not have fully developed) at the time of the transfer." 24 By way
-UCC 3-1o4, Comment, Points 1 and 2.
2UCC 3-605, Comment, Point 2 states that the methods stated in the section by
which an instrument may be cancelled "are exclusive."
1163 Va. 417, 176 S. E. 438 (1934).
24

id. at 443.

8
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of contrast, under a simple statute of set-offs "an assignee of a nonnegotiable instrument took it subject to set-offs (in favor of the promisor) to which it was subject in the hands of the assignor at the time
of the assignment and also subject to any set-offs against the assignor
which the original promisor might acquire after the assignment before
he received notice of it.... But this did not follow as to a negotiable
instrument even when it was transferred after maturity. '25
A conflict in the decisions admittedly exists, 26 although the UCC

does not note the conflict. Britton considers the view taken by the
Virginia court in the Stegal case to be the better view. 27 It seems clear

that the UCC would change the result in the Stegal case since the
Virginia court based its decision on a distinction between an action
on a simple contract and an action on a negotiable instrument. Yet,
so far as the comment in the UCC would indicate, the draftsmen rephrased the NIL without realizing that any change of substance was
being effected.
II. FORM AND CONSTRUCTION
A.

REQUISITES OF NEGOTIABILITY

I. General. The fundamental requisites of negotiability of commercial paper remain unchanged. The instrument must be in writing,
signed by the maker or drawer, contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money (and no other promise, order,
obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized by the UCC), be payable on demand or at a definite time, and be
28
payable to order or bearer.
Two terms that were left undefined in the NIL are defined in the
UCC. "A 'promise' is an undertaking to pay and must be more than an
acknowledgement of an obligation." 29 "An 'order' is a direction to
pay and must be more than an authorization or request."303 "Definite"
is substituted for "at a fixed or determinable future time." '
A writing which complies with these requirements is a "draft"
21Id. at 442. See Va. statute on set-offs, Va. § 8-239.
2OBeute1's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law 841-4 (7th ed. 1948); Britton,
Bills and Notes 728-730 (1943).
2TBritton, Bills and Notes, 729-730 (1943).
2Cf. NIL x (Va. § 6-353) with UCC 3-104.

2OUCC 3-1o0()(c).
tm

UCC 3-102 (1)(b).
Cf. NIL 1(2) with UCC 3-104(1)(c).

81
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(which term is used instead of bill of exchange as under the NIL) if it
is an order, and a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand. (The UCC, like the NIL, does not deal with the
somewhat anomalous position of a post-dated check.)3 2 It is a "certificate
of deposit" if it is an acknowledgement by a bank of receipt of money
with an engagement to repay it,33 or a "note" if it is a promise other
34
than a certificate of deposit.

2. On Demand. As under the NIL, instruments payable on demand
are those payable at sight or on presentation or in which no time
for payment is stated. 35 The last sentence of the present NIL 7 (Va. Sec.
6-359) is omitted with the result that a person taking an instrument
after maturity cannot acquire due course status as against a party
indorsing after maturity. Indorsers after maturity, however, are not
entitled to presentment, notice of dishonor, or protest.8 6
3. Unconditional Promise or Order. A promise or order is not
unconditional if the instrument states that it is subject to or governed
by any other agreement, but it is not made conditional by statements
that show the instrument is subject to implied or constructive conditions, show the consideration, the transaction that gave rise to the instrument, that it was drawn under a letter of credit, or that it is
secured. A promise or order is not unconditional if an instrument is
to be paid only out of a particular fund, but indication of a particular
fund to be debited does not render it conditional. However, the promise
or order of a governmental agency to pay out of a particular fund, and
of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust, or estate, to pay only
out of its entire assets is unconditional. This section is intended to
resolve certain conflicts that developed under the NIL, as well as to
37
extend negotiability in a limited area.
4. Sum Certain. The meaning of a sum certain is clarified so as
to resolve any conflicts by making clear that stated different rates of
interest before and after default or a specified date, or stated discount or addition if paid before or after the fixed date, will not affect the certainty of the sum. Provision for payment with costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both upon default does not affect the

3Britton, supra, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1, 31.
mAccord: Dickenson v. Charles, 173 Va. 393, 4 S. E. 2d 356 (1939).

"UCC

3-104(2).

'Cf. 3-1o8 with NIL 7 (Va. § 6-359). See McVeigh's Ex'r v. Howard, 87 Va.
599 (1891) which takes the same view.
wCf. UCC 3-ioS and Comment with NIL 7 (Va. § 6-359).
87Cf. UCC 3-1o5 with NIL 3 (Va. § 6-355).
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certainty of the sum, but the UCC would not validate such terms if
38
otherwise illegal.
5. Money. A negotiable instrument must be payable in money.
Money is not limited to legal tender, but means a medium of exchange
authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part
of its currency. 39 "Currency" or "current funds" are money.40 Instruments payable in foreign currency are negotiable and may be
satisfied by payment in dollars at the buying sight rate on the day the
instrument is payable, or if payable on demand, on the day of demand.
If a foreign currency is specified as the medium of payment, the in41
strument is payable in that currency.
While the provision that instruments expressed in foreign currencies are negotiable clarifies a point that was a little doubtful under
the NIL, the additional provisions as respects payment of such instruments are perhaps more illusory than of real content. Under the
exchange controls now in effect throughout the world except in the
United States and Canada, circulation of a country's currency outside
its own territory is generally prohibited. Instruments calling for the
payment in the United States of a foreign currency subject to exchange
control would probably be void and payment in that currency illegal
under the law of the country whose currency is involved. More important, the UCC does not indicate what result will follow from a
default in payment in foreign currency of an instrument specifying
such currency as the medium of payment. It may be that if action
is then brought a judgment will be recovered in American dollars
calculated at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the default. If so, the provision in the instrument specifying foreign currency as a medium of payment has for all practical purposes been nullified.
That the judgment must be in dollars, or at least dischargeable in
dollars, would seem to be required in Virginia under Section 6-341.
This section of the Virginia Code, like the UCC, does not touch the
really important issue involved in actions respecting foreign curren8Cf. UCC 3-1o6 with NIL 2 (Va. § 6-354). The law in Virginia sustaining a
clause calling for payment of reasonable attorney fees would remain unchanged.
See Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 1oo S. E. 666 (igig); Triplett v. Second Nat. Bank,
121 Va. 189, 92 S. E. 897 (1917); Colley v. Summers Parrott Hdw. Co., iig Va. 439
89 S. E. 9o6 (sgs6).
'UCC
0

1-201(24).

' Cf. UCC 3-107(l) with NIL 6(5) (Va. § 6-358 (5)).

4 UCC 3-107(2).
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cies, that is, the time which, or the rate of exchange that, will be
used to convert foreign currencies into dollars. In times of fluctuating
exchange rates this is a difficult problem at the very heart of issues
involved in the litigation.
While Section 6-341 of the Virginia Code is not inconsistent with
the UCC, its value is doubtful, since it would prevent entry of a
judgment calling for payment of a foreign currency. Admittedly,
American courts have not done this, but there appears to be no inherent reason why it cannot be done in appropriate cases. And it is
probably the only effective way to carry out the provisions in the UCC
as respects instruments payable in foreign currencies.
6. Definite Time. "Definite time" has been substituted for "fixed
or determinable future time." As a result the rule of NIL 4(3) (Va.
Sec. 6-356) that provides that an instrument payable a fixed time
after specified event which is certain to happen, thought uncertain
as to the time of happening, is reversed. Instruments payable "one year
42
after the war" are no longer negotiable.
7. Acceleration Clauses.4 3 The provision relating to acceleration
clauses which was included in the NIL section on "Sum Certain" has
been shifted in the UCC to the section on "Definite Time. ' 44 Ambiguities and conflicts under the NIL have been resolved by giving
a blessing to all acceleration clauses, 45 but this blessing has been slightly
diluted by a restrictive definition of an option to accelerate at will.
3-1o9 Definite Time.

"(i) An instrument is payable at a definite time if by its terms it
is payable...
(c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration; ..
1-2o8 Option to Accelerate at Will.
"A term providing that one party may accelerate payment or
performance or require collateral or additional collateral not
on stated contingencies but 'at will' or 'when he deems himself
insecure' or in words of similar import means that he has power
to do so only in the good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired but the burden of establishing
lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has
been exercised."
'Cf. UCc 3-109(2) with NIL 4(3) (Va. § 6-356(3)).
13Acceleration Clauses in Time Paper Under the NIL and the Uniform Commercial Code, ioi U. of Pa. L. Rev. 835-51 (1953) (discusses official draft).
"Cf. NIL 2 (3) (Va. § 6-354 (3)) with UCC 3-109(l)(c).
' Country Club of Portsmouth, Inc. v. Wilkins, 166 Va. 325, 186 S. E. 23 (1936)
upheld an automatic acceleration clause.

12
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Section 6-348 of the Virginia Code relating to the rate of interest
allowable to banks, stockbrokers, brokers dealing in options and
futures, says that:
"... any bank may charge in advance the legal rate of interest
upon the entire amount of any loan, payable in weekly, monthly
or other periodical installment, and any note evidencing such an
installment loan may provide that the entire unpaid balance
thereof, at the option of the holder, shall become due and payable upon default in payment of any stipulated installment,
without impairing the negotiability of such note, if otherwise
negotiable."
Under the UCC it would seem that this provision permitting a clause
in a certain type of bank paper authorizing acceleration at the option
of the holder would be unnecessary under UCC 3-109.
Although the two sections of the UCC are not "technically" repugnant, Professor Britton has expressed the fear that unexpected and
conflicting results may develop. He also expressed the view that UCC
3-1o9 as drafted, together with UCC 1-218, may invite the courts to
take a more narrow view of acceleration clauses than was intended by
the drafters of the UCC. He advocates eliminating 1-2o8 and redrafting 3-1o9.46
8. Extension Clauses. Professor Britton has also criticized the UCC
provisions as to extension dauses. 4 These provisions are as follows:
"Section 3-109. Definite Time.
"(1) An instrument is payable at a definite time if by its terms
it is payable ...
(d) at a definite time subject to extension at the option of
the holder, or to extension to a further definite time at the
option of the maker or automatically upon or after a specified act or event."
"Section 3-118. Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction.
"The following rules apply to every instrument: ...
(f) Notwithstanding any terms of the instrument, the holder
may extend it only with'the consent of the maker at the
time of extension. Unless otherwise specified consent to extension authorizes a single extension for not longer than the
original period."
The criticism made by Britton of these sections is fourfold:
(a) Literally Section 3-1o9 (i)(d) authorizes a clause which permits
"Britton, supra, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. i at
7
d. at 15-19.

1o-15.
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the holder to extend time of payment, before or after maturity, indefinitely, contrary to the principle that the time of payment of a negotiable instrument must be at a definite time. This defect is cured by
Section 3-118 (f) by requiring the consent of the maker at the time
of extension. The cure, however, is so broadly worded that Section
3 -io 9 (i)(d) is nullified in that every extension of time at the option
of the holder can only be made with the consent of the maker.
(b) While iog(i) (d) applies against both makers and acceptors,
3-1 18(f) only requires the consent of makers. The possibility is thus
open for a clause that permits the holder to extend time of payment
indefinitely as against an acceptor, without his consent. The alternative
is to read "acceptor" into Section 3-1 18(f).
(c) There appears to be no purpose in the use of the word "further"
as respects extension clauses giving the option to the maker, the word
not being used as respects extension clauses in which the holder has
the option.
(d) Section 3 -iog(i)(d) requires that an extension at the option of
the maker or automatically upon or after a specified act or event must
be to a further definite time. This further definite time may be the
"indefinite" definite time permissible under this section in the option
to extend given to the holder. Section 3-1 18 does not cure this defect
since no reference is made to that section.
Professor Britton advocates, in the light of these criticisms, elimination of Section 3-118 and redrafting 3 -iog(i)(d).
9. To Order. The definition of order instruments has been clarified.4 S "Or assigns" is accepted as the equivalent of "or order." An in-

strument conspicuously designated on its face as "exchange" or the
like and naming a payee is order paper.
An instrument may be payable to the order of two or more payees
together or in the alternative; the word "jointly" contained in the
NIL has been eliminated because of a possible implication of a right
of survivorship that might be derived.4 9
An instrument payable in the alternative, as to the order of "A
or B," is payable to either and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by the one in possession. If the payees are not in the alternative,
as "A and B," the instrument is payable only to both, both must indorse or bring action, and the rights of one are not discharged without
his consent by the act of the other. 50
'Cf. NIL 8 (Va. § 6-36o) with UCC 3-110.
"Id.
r'Cf. NIL 41 (Va. § 6-393) with UCC 3-116.
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An instrument payable to the order of an estate, trust, or fund is
payable to the order of its representative or his successor. 51 If the instrument is payable to a fiduciary, other than an agent or officer, for
a specified person or purpose, it is payable to the named payee; sub52
sequent holders are put on notice of the payee's fiduciary position.
The policy of NIL 42 (Va. Sec. 6-394) under which an instrument
payable to a person as "cashier" or other fiscal officer of a bank or
corporation is deemed payable either to the bank or corporation or
to the officer is continued, but expanded so as to include any instrument payable to a named person as agent or officer of a specified person. Such instruments are payable to the principal but the agent or
5
officer may act as if he were the holder. 3
In an instrument payable to a named person with additional words
describing him in any other manner, as "John Doe, 1121 Main Street"
or "John Doe, Trustee," the additional words are without effect on
subsequent parties, the instrument being payable unconditionally to
the payee named. Such a payee, if otherwise identified, may negotiate.
enforce, or discharge the instrument even though he does not meet
the description.5 4
lo. To Bearer. The purpose of the UCC with respect to bearer
paper is to take instruments which purport to designate a named
payee out of this classification.55 Instruments payable to fictitious
named payees are thus order instruments, as they appear to be on their
face. To handle the problem of the fictitious payee, indorsements in
such fictitious names are made effective. 56
Bearer instruments are consequently limited to those which are
payable to bearer, order of bearer, a specified person or bearer, cash,
order of cash, "or any other indication which does not purport to
designate a specific payee."
"Pay to the order of
"is an incomplete instrument
and not payable to bearer. Probably, an instrument in which a line
is drawn through the space for the payee's name is bearer paper, since
the line is an indication which does not purport to designate a specific payee. Because of the difficulty of distinguishing in print between
a handwritten line, a printed line, and a blank space, the comment on
.51UG 3-110.

52UCC 3-117.
1'Cf. NIL 42 (Va. § 6-394) with UCC 3-117.

rUCC 3-117.
5Cf. NIL 9 (Va. § 6-361) with UCC 3-,u.
'UCG 3-405.
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this point is not clear and is susceptible of the interpretation that the
57
instrument is incomplete.
Nor is the UCC entirely clear as to the nature of an instrument
that reads "Pay order of Treasurer of X Corporation," there not being
such an officer or such a corporation, and the instrument is so drawn
through mistake.
A comment in the UCC states that "Pay Treasurer of X Corporation," there not being such an officer, is not bearer payer. Unfortunately, the illustration used is not order paper either, but non-negotiable.
In First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. People's National Bank of Rocky Mount, Virginia,5s a draft was drawn on a
printed form in favor of the First National Bank of Milwaukee, also
printed. This bank had become consolidated as the First Wisconsin
National Bank of Milwaukee. Through inadvertence the name of the
payee was not corrected. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that the First Wisconsin National Bank could be considered the
legal holder as the instrument was bearer paper because payable to
the order of a fictitious or non-existent person under NIL 9(3) (Va.
Sec. 6-361). The UCC would change this result.
The Virginia Court also thought that the instrument could be
treated as one in which the name of a payee is wrongly designated
and under NIL 43 (Va. Sec. 6-395) could be indorsed by payee intended
as described in the instrument. Under UCC 3-203 the indorsement
may be as in the instrument, or correctly, or both; with a person taking
the instrument for value being able to require signature in both
names.
More doubtfully the Virginia Court thought the bank "had the
right to insert its own name as payee," apparently on the theory that
the instrument was incomplete. It is doubtful, even if sound under the
NIL, that this result could be reached under the UCC.
ii.

Order-Bearer. Under UCC 3-111 an instrument payable to

"order of bearer" is bearer paper. Under UCC 3-110(3) "An instrument
made payable both to order and to bearer is payable to order unless the
bearer words are handwritten or typewritten."
While these sections have been criticized by Professor Britton,5 9
it would seem that the proper application of UCC 3-111 by its terms is
only to instruments in which no payee is designated and conversely
7UCC 3-111, Comment, Point 2.

M136

Va. 276, 118 S. E. 82, 36 A. L. R. 736 (1923).
i at 25-27.

C'Britton, 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
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UCC 3-110(3) only applies when there is a designated payee. As so
interpreted the sections can be applied without difficulty.
12. Terms and Omissions Not Affecting Negotiability. As under
the NIL negotiability is not affected by an omission of a statement of
consideration, or where the instrument is drawn or payable, 60 or that
it is undated, antedated, or postdated. 61 An undated instrument payable "thirty days after date" is incomplete because not payable at a
definite time. The date may be inserted as provided in the section on
incomplete instruments.6 2 When the instrument is dated, time of
payment is determined from the stated date.63 Similarly, time of payment of antedated or postdated instruments is determined by the
stated date. 64 An antedated instrument may be due before it is issued.6 5
Dates in instruments are presumed correct. 66
Under the NIL a seal did not affect the negotiability of an instrument, but under some decisions certain provisions of the NIL, as those
relating to consideration, were held inapplicable to sealed instruments.
This is changed under the UCC. Sealed instruments are within the Article on Commercial Paper. However, other statutes or rules of law
relating to sealed instruments still may be applied as a longer statute
of limitations. 67 The Virginia statute of limitations of ten years on negotiable instruments under seal and of five years on others would not be
affected by the UCC.68
Statements that collateral has been given, or authorizing sale on
default, or promises to give additional collateral on demand are permitted; the NIL only made explicit reference to authorizations to sell
69
collateral if the instrument was not paid at maturity.
Likewise permitted is a "term authorizing a confession of judgment on the instrument if it is not paid when due."70 Since Virginia
6°Cf. NIL 6 (Va. § 6-358) with UCC 3-1 2(1)(a).

01Cf. NIL 12 (Va. § 6-364) and NIL 13 (Va. § 6-365) with UCC 3-114(1).
6Cf. NIL 13 (Va. § 6-365) with UCC 3-115.
63 Cf. NIL 13 (Va. § 6-365) with UCC 3-114, Comment, Point 2.
"UCC 3-114, Comment, Point 2.
6UCC 3-114, Comment, Point 2.
"Cf. NIL ii

(Va. § 6-363) with UCC 3-114(3).

67Cf. NIL 6(4) (Va. § 6-358(4)) with UCC 3-113.
3

6 See Va. 8-13, Quackenbush v. Isley, 154 Va. 407, 153 S. E. 818 (1930).
OCf. NIL 5(1) (Va. § 6-357(1)) with UCC 3-112(i)(b) and (c).

'OCf. NIL 5(2) (Va. § 6-357(2)) with UCC 3-112(1)(d). The first sentence of Comment, Point 2, UCC 3-112 is poorly phrased, reading "As under the original Section 5
(2), paragraph (d) is intended to mean that a confession of judgment may be authorized only if the instrument is not paid when due, and that otherwise negotiability is
affected. It would seem that the word "otherwise" should be omitted and the word
"affected" changed to "unaffected."
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has recognized the validity of negotiable instruments containing
powers of attorney,71 it is worthy of note that under UCG 3-109(1)(c)
an instrument may contain any acceleration clause, but under UCC
3-1 12(1)(d) only a term authorizing a confession of judgment on the
instrument "if it is not paid when due" is permitted.
In Walker v. Temple72 the court impliedly recognized the validity
of a warrant of attorney to confess judgment "at any time," although
confession of judgment was in fact taken after maturity, and the court
considered the attorney named to be the agent of the obligor.73
It is at least doubtful if a term authorizing a confession of judgment
when a default is brought about under an acceleration clause is permitted. "When due" may well refer to the maturity date stated in the
instrument.
Also permitted is a term purporting to waive the benefit of any law
74
intended for the advantage or protection of any obligor.
A new term permitted under the UCC is one in a draft providing
that the payee by endorsing or cashing it acknowledges full satisfaction
of an obligation of the drawer75
6
Terms otherwise illegal, however, are not validated by the UCC.7
The provision in the NIL giving the holder an election to require
something to be done in lieu of payment of money 77 has been dropped
as being primarily of importance in investment securities and undesirable in commercial paper. 78
B. CONSTRUcrION

i. Ambiguous Terms. The UCC provides rules of construction
similar to the NIL for determining the meaning of ambiguities in
negotiable instruments. 79 Where there is doubt whether the instrument
is a draft or a note the holder may treat it as either. A draft drawn on
the drawer is effective as a note. Handwritten terms control typewritten
and printed terms, and typewritten control printed. Words control
7'Colona v. Parksley National Bank, 120 Va. 812, 92 S. E. 979 (1917).
i3o Va. 567, 107 S. E. 720 (1921).
"3The opinion does not reveal the type of "contract" for the payment of money
that was involved.
"Cf. NIL 5(3) (Va. § 6-357(3)) with UCC 3-112(1)(e).

7'UCC 3-112(1)(f).
"'Cf.NIL 5(3) (Va. § 6-357) last sentence with UCC
7NIL 5(4) (Va. § 6-357 (4)).

3-112(2).

7UCC 3-112, Comment.
'CE. UCC 3-18 with NIL 17 (Va. § 6-369) and 68 (Va. § 6-420).
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figures except that if the words are ambiguous, figures control. Unless
the instrument otherwise specifies, two or more persons who sign
as maker, acceptor or drawer or indorser and as a part of the same
transaction are jointly and severally liable even though the instrument
contains such words as "I promise to pay."
2. Payable Through Bank. Under the UCC an instrument "payable through" a bank, or the like, designates that bank as a collecting
bank to make presentment, but does not of itself authorize the bank
to pay the instrument. This section is new.8 0
3. Payable At Bank.81 Under Section 3-121 the UCC proposes
alternative rules, either of which may be used by states adopting the
Code.
"Alternative AA note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a
bank is the equivalent of a draft drawn on the bank payable
when it falls due out of any funds of the maker or acceptor in
current account or otherwise available for such payment.
"Alternative BA note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank
is not of itself an order or authorization to the bank to pay it."
According to UCC draftsmen, Alternative A states the New York
commercial understanding and Alternative B states the understanding
in the south and west. Alternative A is in accord with NIL Section 87
(Va. Sec. 6-440) in effect in Virginia. Original section 87, according to
the Comment on Section 3-12 1,has been so extensively amended that
uniformity has not been achieved, and in many parts of the country
the section has been consistently disregarded in practice. Present
practices are well established, with the division along geographical
lines. The instruments involved are chiefly promissory notes, which
infrequently cross state lines, so that there is no great need for uniformity. This rationale has, however, been criticized and the adoption
82
of a provision essentially similar to Alternative A urged.
4. Accrual of Cause of Action. In Section 3-122 the UCC makes
explicit provision for the time at which causes of action accrue on
negotiable instruments and interest rates. The rule that action can be
°UCC 3-120.
8'Steffen, Instruments "Payable At" a Bank, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 55-76 (1950).
This article criticizes this section as contained in the Spring 195o draft. Alternative
"A" taken in conjunction with other sections of the Code seems to go a long way
to meet the author's criticisms.
Id. at 56-57.
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brought on a demand note immediately upon issue, without demand,
is continued. However, an exception is made as respects certificates of
deposit; following banking custom a demand must be made before any
liability is incurred by the bank. A similar provision is contained in
Va. Section 8-13 relating to statutes of limitations, which provision
would be unnecessary if the UCC were adopted.
Demand on time certificates can only be made on or after the date
of maturity. A cause of action against a maker or an acceptor on a
time instrument accrues on the day after maturity. A cause of action
against a drawer of a draft or an indorser of any instrument accrues
upon demand following dishonor; notice of dishonor is a demand.8 3
Unless otherwise provided in the instrument, interest runs at the rate
provided by law for a judgment from the date of demand in case
of a maker of a demand note, and from the date of accrual of the
cause of action in all other cases.
The section makes no explicit reference to when the cause of action
accrues on paper which has been accelerated. 84
5.Interest.8 5 Section 3-122 (4) of the UCC provides:
"(4) Unless an instrument provides otherwise, interest runs
at the rate provided by law for a judgment.
"(a) in the case of a maker of a demand note, from the date
of demand;
"(b) in all other cases from the date of accrual of the cause
of action."8 6
This section resolves a conflict in the cases by providing that interest on demand notes runs from the date of demand and not the date
'In Mann v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 136 Va. 35i, ns8 S. E.326 (1923) in which the
question was not directly involved the court said the cause of action of the last indorser against a prior indorser accrued upon payment by the last indorser. The
court held that the cause of action was on the instrument and so covered by
the five-year statute of limitations and not the three-year statute on implied contracts.
'See Country Club of Portsmouth, Inc. v. Wilkins, 166 Va. 325, 186 S.E. 23
(1936). Due date clear from terms of acceleration clause.
See also Walker v. Temple, 13o Va. 567, 107 S.E. 720 (1921). Warrant of attorney authorizing confession of judgment "at any time" does not change statute
of limitations, which still runs from due date.
'See Smedley, Interest Damages in Virginia, 28 Va. L. Rev. 1138-166 (1942)
for a comprehensive discussion of the subject.
"UCC 3-18(d) continues the rule contained in NIL 17(2) (Va. § 6-369(2)) that
when an instrument calls for payment without specifying the date, the instrument
is to be construed as providing for interest from its date, or if undated then from
its issue. The UCC makes clear that the "judgment rate at the place of payment"
is intended.
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of the note. Interest on a note with a definite time of payment begins
to run on the day after maturity under the UCC; the Virginia cases
contain conflicting dicta as to whether interest in such cases runs
from the date of receipt of the money87 or the date when the loan is

payable.

8s

In Virginia an instrument expressly provided to be "without interest" bears interest after maturity.8 9 The UCC is not clear on this

point.
Under Virginia Code Section 8-22 3 the jury, and perhaps the court,
has discretion to fix the time when interest commences and the rate
in "any action.., on contract."9 0 The section seems to be in fundamental conflict with UCC 3-122(4), and perhaps also with the policy
underlying the NIL. Under Virginia law it is not entirely clear whether
a jury can handle interest differently from that called for by an express contract provision, or the scope of the discretion that may be
exercised when there is no explicit contract provision relating to
interest.91 If the jury returns a verdict that does not allow interest, the
sum found nevertheless bears interest from the date of the verdict.
Similarly, if the judgment of the court fails to allow interest, the judgment nevertheless bears interest.
The Virginia law as to the interest rate provided by law for a
judgment is not dear. A federal court seems to have taken what may
be conflicting views of Virginia law on this point, one view being that
the legal rate of 6 per cent is required, 92 while under the other view
93
an express contract rate will continue after judgment.
'Craufurd's Adm'r v. Smith's Ex'r, 93 Va. 623, 23 S.E. 235, 25 S.E. 657 (1896);
Southern Railway Co. v. Glenn's Administrator, 102 Va. 529, 46 S. E. 776 (1904);
Vashon v. Barrett, 1O5 Va. 490, 54 S. E. 705 (19o6); Hall v. Graham, 112 Va. 56o,
72 S. E. 1O5 (1911).

"SChapman's Adm'rs v. Shepherd's Adm'r, 24 Gratt. 377 (1874); Roberts' Adm'r v.
Cocke, 28 Gratt. 207 (1877); McVeigh's Ex'r v. Howard, 87 Va. 599, 13 S. E.
31 (1891); Parsons v. Parsons, 167 Va. 374, 189 S. E. 448 (1937); Beale v. Moore, x83
Va. 519, 32 S. E. (2d) 696 (1945).
"Goins v. Garber, 131 Va. 59, io8 S. E. 868 (1921).
'See also Va. § 8-347, which excepts by reference Va. § 6-422 of the NIL from
its operation.
"Washington and Old Dominion Railway v. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., 120 Va. 62o, 91 S.E. 646 (1917); Latham v. Powell, 127 Va. 382, 103
S. E. 638 (192o); Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc. v.' Thomas Branch
& Co., 147 Va. 509, 137 S. E. 62o (1927); Pittston Co. v. O'Hara, 191 Va. 886, 63
S. E. (2d) 34 (1951).
"City of Danville v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 34 F. Supp. 620 (IV. D. Va. 1940).
"SBoswell v. Big Vein Pocahontas Coal Co., 217 Fed. 822 (W. D. Va. 1914).
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Some amendments of the Virginia statutes would seem to be de94
sirable if the UCC is adopted.
C. INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENTS

Section 3-115 of UCC provides as follows:

"(1) When a paper whose contents at the time of signing
show that it is intended to become an instrument is signed while
still incomplete in any necessary respect it cannot be enforced
until completed, but when it is completed in accordance with
authority given it is effective as completed.
"(2) If the completion is unauthorized the rules as to material alteration apply (Sec. 3-407), even though the paper was
not delivered by the maker or drawer; but the burden of establishing that any completion is unauthorized is on the party
so asserting." 95
According to subsection (i) while an instrument is "still incomplete
in any necessary respect it cannot be enforced until completed..." It
is not clear whether this provision would affect the result in Allen v.
Rouseville Cooperage Co.96 In that case an instrument was sued
upon which was payable "forty-five
after." The plaintiff
in his pleading set forth an exact copy of the note and alleged that
the note was payable "forty-five days after date." Circumstantial
evidence indicated that this was the true intention, and the court
held that by this allegation the plaintiff "in effect exercises his authority to fill in the blank." 97 The court distinguished Chestnut v.
Chestnut,9s in which a note was held inadmissible in evidence which
contained the marginal notation, "$i,8oo. Eighteen hundred dollars," but which was blank in the body as to the amount payable. The
distinction was that in the Chestnut case there was a "variance between the note declared upon and the note offered in evidence." 99
At common law in the United States when an incomplete instrument was negotiated to a holder for value, who was without notice of
any limitation upon the authority to complete the instrument other
14UCC 3-122(4) could be amended to provide that interest runs at the rate "of
six per centum per annum" instead of the rate "provided by law for a judgment."
Va. § 8-223 should also then be amended to provide that it would be inapplicable
to cases arising under the UCC.
Cf. with NIL 13 (Va. § 6-365), 14 (Va. § 6-366), and 15 (Va. § 6-367).
Eq157 Va. 355, 161 S. E. 5o (1931).
OId. 157 Va. at 371.
091o4 Va. 539, 52 S. E. 348 (19o5).
"Allen v. Rouseville Cooperage Co., 157 Va. 355, 370, 161 S. E. 50 (1931).
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than that given by the incomplete instrument itself, the authority
in such holder to complete it was absolute. It was not a defense
against such holder for value that the instrument was not completed
strictly in accordance with the authority given.' 0 0 This rule was
changed under NIL 14 (Va. Sec. 6-366) so that the person in possession
only had prima facie authority to complete the instrument. The holder
who takes for value must ascertain at his peril the real authority of the
person intrusted with the incomplete instrument. 101
Under the UCC an unauthorized completion of an incomplete
instrument constitutes a material alteration. Even so, a party who is not
a holder in due course can enforce the completed instrument according to the authority given if the material alteration is not also fraudulent. 0 2 If the completion of the instrument is fraudulent, then a party
who is not a holder in due course cannot enforce the instrument
against any party whose contract has been changed, unless the party has
assented or is precluded from asserting the defense. 03 A subsequent
holder in due course can enforce the completed instrument, whether
the completion was fraudulent or not, either as completed or according to the authority given. 10 4
The reference in NIL 14 (Va. Sec. 6-366) to the delivery of a signature on an otherwise blank paper in order that it may be converted
to a negotiable instrument has been omitted as involving an obsolete
and undesirable practice. "The omission is not intended, however, to
mean that any person may not be authorized to write in an instrument
over a signature either before or after delivery," according to the
Comment in the UCC.105 It is difficult to see, nevertheless, how such
a result can be reached under the language of the UCC, since a blank
piece of paper would not have "contents at the time of signing" that
show that it is "intended to become an instrument."
The language of subsection (2), "even though the paper was not
delivered" reverses the rule set forth in NIL 15 to the effect that
20'Frank & Adler v. Lilenfeld, 33 Gratt. 377 (i88o).

-Guerrant v. Guerrant and Hughes, 7 Va. L. Reg. 639 (1902). See also Brown
v. Thomas, 12o Va. 763, 767-769, 92 S. E. 977 (1917).
"'UCC 3 -407 (2)(b).
'03UCC 3-407(2)(a).
'"This is the interpretation placed on UCO 3-407 in the Comment, Point 4,
3d paragraph. The section quite clearly states that the subsequent holder in due
course can enforce the instrument as completed, and it would seem under the actual
wording of the text of the section that this is the only remedy of a holder in due
course.
1"UCO 3-115, Comment, Point 3.
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an incomplete instrument which had not been delivered, if completed
and negotiated without authority, was not a valid contract in the
hands of any holder as against any person whose signature was placed
thereon before delivery. Nondelivery and unauthorized completion
after delivery are not, under the UCC, valid defenses against a holder
in due course. 106
The effect of an instrument blank only as to the payee's name
is not entirely clear under the UCC. Such an instrument cannot be
treated as bearer paper under the UCC, a result sometimes reached
under the NIL.107 Under the UCC the instrument is an incomplete
order instrument. 08 Under UCC 3-115(l) the instrument "cannot be

enforced until completed."' 09 Perhaps, bringing suit upon the instrument would constitute such completion. 110
Suppose the maker of a note delivered the note to A, authorizing
him to fill in his own name as payee. A fails to do so and transfers
the instrument to B for value. It would seem that for B to fill in his
own name as payee would be a material alteration as the instrument
would be completed "otherwise than as authorized.""' Nevertheless,
as the filling-in would not be fraudulent, the instrument could be enforced "according to the authority given." 1 2 Yet, under the authority
given, the instrument can be completed only by filling in A's name
as payee. The transfer would vest in the transferee, B, such rights as
the transferor had 1 3 and the specifically enforceable right to have
the unqualified indorsement of the transferor. 1 4 Nevertheless, the
difficulty posed by Section 3-115(l) that the instrument cannot be

enforced until completed remains, since B's name is written in as
payee while the instrument must be enforced as though A's name
was written thereon. Under the NIL it would seem there was no
unqualified right to fill in the name of a predecessor in title. Yet,
in special circumstances this might be done. 115 Perhaps, the problem
can be worked out under the UCC, but no improvement over the
NIL is readily ascertainable.
"'Sutherland, supra, at 245-6.
O'Britton, Bills and Notes 328-9 (1945).
'61UCC 3-111, Comment, Point 2.
""Britton, supra, at 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1, 27-28 criticizes this provision as a
"triumph of historic formalism over substance."
2"See Allen v. Rouseville Cooperage Co., 157 Va. 355, 161 S. E. 5o (1931).
tmUCC 3-407((a).
22UCC 3-407(2 ) .
U3CC 3-201(l).
21UCC 3-201(3).
" Britton, Bills and Notes 327-8 (1943).
1
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III. NEGOTIATION AND TRANSFER

A.

NEGOTIATION

"Issue" under the UCC "means the first delivery of an instrument
to a holder or a remitter."" 6 "Issue" under the NIL is defined as "the
first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who
takes it as a holder."" 7 The UCC has thus made two changes in the
concept of "issue": A remitter may take by issue and an incomplete
instrument may be issued.
A "holder" is defined under both the UCC 118 and the NIL 119 as
a person who is in possession of an instrument drawn, issued, or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or ih blank. By reason of
the change in the definition of "issue" a remitter becomes a "holder"
under the UCC, whereas he was not under the NIL.
"Negotiation," under the UCC, "is the transfer of an instrument
in such form that the transferee becomes a holder."' 20 The language
of the NIL is similar. 121 However, the NIL also states that if an instrument is payable to order "it is negotiated by the indorsement of
the holder completed by delivery."' 22 So that the NIL seems to draw
a distinction between the "issue" and the "negotiation" of an instrument. "Issue" is the first delivery to a holder, who will ordinarily be
the payee. Subsequent transfers between holders constitute negotiations.
If, under the NIL, the first delivery of an instrument to the
payee is not a negotiation, and if also in order to be a holder a party
must take by negotiation, then the payee cannot be a holder in due
course.123 Some courts, including the Virginia court in National Bank
of Suffolk v. American Bank and Trust Co., 124 in order to permit a
payee to be a holder in due course have taken the position that the
NIL definition of negotiation is not exclusive and that a payee may
take by negotiation.
The UCC provides that bearer instruments may be negotiated by
delivery and that "if the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated
U'UCC 3-102(1)(a).
1

2 NIL 191 (Va. § 6-544).
MUCC 1-201(20).
"'NIL 191 (Va. § 6-544).
"'UCC 3-202().

'-"NIL 3o
11NIL 3o
"'NIL 52
"163 Va.

(Va. § 6-382), first sentence.
(Va. § 6-382), second sentence.
(Va. § 6-4o4).
710, 177 S. E. 229 (1934).
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by delivery with any necessary indorsement."112 Since no indorsement
is necessary in order for the payee to become a holder of the instrument,
it would seem that the payee takes by negotiation. 12 6 If so, the roadblock under the NIL to holder in due course status for payees has
been removed on the theory used by the Virginia court in the American
Bank and Trust Co. case.
Having opened the road the draftsmen of the UCC chose not to
follow it, but instead struck a new path through virgin territory by
eliminating the requirement that a holder in due course take an instrument by negotiation. A payee may be a holder in due course, not
because he takes by negotiation, but because negotiation is not neces27
sary to holder in due course standing.
What the difference is under the UCC between the "issue" of an
instrument and the "negotiation" of the instrument is not readily apparent. 12 And there appears to be no ascertainable reason why any distinction should be madel The whole idea of "issue" as distinguished
from "negotiation" should be dropped.
Moreover, if a holder in due course can reach that lofty status
without even taking the instrument by negotiation, wherein lies the
peculiar significance of negotiability?
B. TRANSFER
1. General. The transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee
such rights as the transferor has therein. 12 9 It may be the transfer
of a limited interest, as a security interest. 30 It may be for value or
as a gift.' 3'
2. Transfer without indorsement. Any transfer for value, but not
as a gift, of an instrument not then payable to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable right to have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor, unless there was an agreement, express or
implied, to the contrary. The type of indorsement to which the trans'dUCC 3-202(1).
'-'But see Britton, supra,

32 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 159.
IOUCC 3-3o2(2) and Comment, Point 3.
2'Britton, supra, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 158-9.
L'UCC 3-201(1); see also Kentucky Virginia Stone Company v. Fortner, 159
Va. 234, 165 S. E. 401 (1932). Note payable to Price Stone and Lime Company.
Evidence showed that R. N. Price owned the note, which was not indorsed. Held
that administrator of Price could enforce note against the maker.
IwCf. UCC 3-2oi with NIL 27 (Va. § 6-379).
LnUCC 3-2oi, Comment, Point 2.
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feree was entitled is not clear under the NIL. 1 32 As under the NIL
negotiation does not take place until the indorsement is actually made,
so that until then the transferee cannot become a holder in due
course, 33 nor is there a presumption that the transferee is the
34
owner.
3. Shelter. The shelter provision of NIL 58 (Va. Sec. 6-43o) under
which a holder who derives title through a holder in due course
acquires all the rights of such holder in due course in respect to all
prior parties is one example of the transferee taking the rights of his
35
transferor, and is continued in the UCC.
The shelter doctrine is subject to the exception "that a transferee
who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the
instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim
against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in
due course."' 36 Under Virginia law a fraudulent payee cannot improve
his position by routing an instrument through a holder in due course,
nor will a third person who ostensibly acts for himself but actually
is acting for the fraudulent payee be permitted to acquire the rights
of a holder in due course from whom he obtains the instrument.
Dictum in the same cases indicates that if a holder in due course
transfers the instrument to a party who has notice of the original
fraud but was not a party to it, then such a party will not acquire the
137
rights of the holder in due course.
The same result would follow under the UCC since a party "who
as a prior holder had notice of a defense" cannot acquire the rights
138
of a holder in due course.
C. INDORSEMENT FoRmiALiTiEs

i. Indorsementson Separate Instruments. "An indorsement must be
written by or on behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a
paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof," according
139
to the UCC.
This provision would change the result in Colona v.

'Cf. UCC 3-2oi with NIL 49 (Va. § 6-401).
"'3National Mechanics Bank v.Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33, i16 S.E.
38o (1923).
2"Cf. UCC 3-201(3) with NIL 49 (Va. § 6-4ol), last sentence.

"UCC

3-201 (1).

"'UCC

3-201(1).

'"Elkhart State Bank v. Bristol Broom Company, 143 Va. 1, 129 S. E. 371
(1925); Aragon Coffee Co. v. Rogers, i5o Va. 51, 52 S.E. 843 (19o6).

IMUCC 3-201, Comment, Point 3(a) and (d).
"'UCC3-202(2) with NIL 31 (Va. § 6-383).
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Parksley Nat. Bank,140 in which a signature in a letter of assignment
attached to a note was held to be a sufficient indorsement. By implication the Colona case also holds that indorsements may be written on
separate papers even though there is room on the instrument for additional indorsements. This question, on which there has been a conflict of authority, is not dealt with in the UCC, so that this implicit
holding in the Colona case remains unchanged.
2. PartialAssignments. "An indorsement is effective for negotiation
only when it conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid residue. If
it purports to be of less, it operates only as a partial assignment."' 41
This provision in the UCC is similar to that in the NIL, but also
states the effect of an attempted negotiation of a part of an instrument.
It operates as a partial assignment with the effect prescribed for such
42
assignments under the law of the particular state.

3. Ivrong or Misspelled Names. Under the UCC instruments
payable to a person under a misspelled or a wrong name may be indorsed by him either correctly or as in the instrument. A person tak143
ing the instrument for value may require signature in both names.

D.

TYPES OF INDORSETMENTS

i. General. The five kinds of indorsements under the NIL 144 have

been reduced to three under the UCC.Qualified and restrictive indorsements are assimilated to special and blank indorsements. A
special indorsement, as under the NIL, specifies the person to whom
or to whose order the instrument is payable. 145 A blank indorsement,
as under the NIL, specifies no particular indorsee and may consist of
a mere signature. 14 6 Conditional indorsements are treated in a separate
1101 2o

Va. 812, 92 S. E.979 (1917).
"Cf. UCC 3-2o2(3) with NIL 32 (Va. § 6-384).
"-Newton v. White, 115 Va. 844, 8o S. E. 561 ('944), action must be brought in
name of assignor; Phillips v. City of Portsmouth, 112 Va. 164, 70 S.E. 502 (1911),
partial assignee cannot sue in -own name; Tyler v. Ricamore, 87 Va. 466, 12 S. E.
799 (i8gi), obligor cannot object if all parties before the court.
"'Cf. UCC 3-203 with NIL 43 (Va. § 6-395). See supra, p. 15 for discussion with
reference to a Virginia case.
"'NIL 33 (Va. § 6-385).
"'Cf. UCC 3-204(1) with NIL 34 (Va. § 6-386); Fleshman v. Bibb, 118 Va. 582,
88 S. E.64 (916).
"1Cf. UCC 3-204 (2) with NIL 34 (Va. § 6-386) and 31 (Va. § 6-383). But see Britton, supra, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 161, who says that permissive use of the signature
alone is substituted for what is probably mandatory under the NIL. Professor
Britton seems clearly in error on this point since NIL 34 (Va. § 6-386) does not
include such a mandatory requirement; in fact it does not refer to the point.
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147
section under the UCC, but as in the NIL are not defined.
2. Effect of Special Indorsements on Bearer Paper.Although there
is little case law, 145 it has been thought that under the NIL a special
indorsement will control a prior blank indorsement of an instrument
payable to order on its face.149 This view is made explicit under
the UCC.15° Under NIL 40, however, an instrument payable to bearer
on its face and specially indorsed could, nevertheless, be negotiated
by delivery. The UCC changes this rule, providing that any instrument
specially indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee
and his indorsement is required to further negotiation. 151
Under NIL 35 (Va. Sec. 6-387) a blank indorsement could be
converted into a special indorsement by writing over the signature
"any contract consistent with the character of the indorsement." This
provision has been eliminated from the UCC as being misleading
and inducing the writing in of unauthorized terms constituting
material alterations of the indorser's contract. The only utility, according to the Comment, of the section was in permitting a holder to
name a special indorsee without signing his name, a result that can
be accomplished by an indorsement without recourse. Another purpose of the section has been pointed out by Professor Britton, who
thinks the section should be restored to the UCC.152 Under the section a holder can write in his own name as special indorsee, and thus
protect himself in event the instrument is stolen and gets in the hands
of a holder in due course. This purpose, under either the NIL or the
UCC,can be accomplished by the holder specially indorsing the instrument to himself.
3. Effect of a Conditional Indorsement. The restrictive indorsement which prohibits the further negotiation of the instrument, as
"Pay A Only,"' 5 3 under NIL 36(1) (Va. Sec. 6-388(1)) has been as1 4
This is
similated to a conditional indorsement under the UCC.

done by construing such an indorsement as if it read "Pay A on condition that he does not transfer."'155 Under the UCG a conditional
""Cf. UCc 3-205 with NIL 39 (Va. § 6-391).
1 8
' Britton, Bills and Notes 247-250 (1943).
1
1NIL 9(5) (Va. § 6-361(5)) and NIL 34 (Va. § 6-386).
UCC 3-204 (2).
mUCC 3-204 (*-

'01Britton, supra, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 153 at 165.
',Power v. Finnie, 4 Call 411 (Va. 1797) is the only American case involving
such an indorsement.
l'UCC 3-205.
2'5UCC 3-205, Comment, Point i.
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indorsement and one purporting to prohibit further transfer is not
effective to prevent further transfer or negotiation, and payment may
be enforced in disregard of the limitation.156 But the indorsee and
subsequent transferees other than a collecting or payor bank, take
the instrument or its proceeds subject to any rights of the indorser.
This is the same result provided for in the NIL as respects conditional indorsements except that under the NIL collecting banks would
hold the instrument or its proceeds subject to any rights of the indorser, while under the UCC they do not. 7 Only a collecting
bank can be a holder in due course of an instrument with a conditional indorsement or one purporting to prohibit further transfer.lls
4. "Qualified Indorsements." Although the UCC does not use
the term "qualified indorsement," the UCC does provide that words of
assignment, condition, waiver, limitation or disclaimer of liability
and the like accompanying an indorsement do not affect its character
as an indorsement.5 9 A conflict under the NIL has been resolved by
providing that words of guaranty operate as an indorsement.' 60
5. "Restrictive Indorsements." Section 36 (Va. Sec. 6-388) and 37
(Va. Sec. 6-389) of the NIL stating when an indorsement is restrictive
and its effect along with NIL 47 (Va. Sec. 6-399) which provided that
an instrument remained negotiable until restrictively indorsed, have
been eliminated from the UCC. As has already been mentioned the
restrictive indorsement that prohibits further negotiation has been assimilated to the conditional indorsement. The other two types provided
for in the NIL, that is, the indorsement that constitutes the indorsee
the agent of the indorser ("for collection") and the indorsement that
vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or to the use of some other
person ("Pay A in trust for B") are covered in UCC 3-2o6, which
reads as follows:
8Under NIL 39 (Va. § 6-391) the payor of an instrument conditionally indorsed could disregard the condition and make payment. The UCC makes explicit, what might be implied under the NIL, that a holder can disregard the
condition in enforcing payment from prior parties. See Britton, supra, 32 Tex. L.
Rev. 153, 164.
5Cf. UCC 3-205 with NIL 39 (Va. § 6-391). The result as respects payor banks
was reached because the drawee bank did not take the instrument by negotiation.
See Britton, supra, 32 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 165-167.
MUCC 3-205, Comment, Point 3. According to this comment it would appear
that a payor bank can be a holder in due course. This appears to be erroneous
since the paying bank does not take by negotiation and is not a holder.
'CoCf.
UCC 3-202(4) with NIL 38 (Va. § 6-390).
1
0OLiability of such an indorser may be affected by the words of guaranty,

however, under UCC

3-202(4).
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"Section 3-2o6. Indorsement 'For Collection,' 'for Deposit,' to
Agent or in Trust.
"When an indorsement whether blank or special, states
that it is 'for collection,' 'for deposit,' or otherwise for the benefit
or account or use of the indorser or another person
(a) the first taker under that indorsement must apply any
value given by him for or on the security of the instrument
in the manner and to the person or account directed by the
indorsement;
(b) to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for
value;
(c) later holders for value are not affected by the direction
contained in the indorsement unless they have reasonable
grounds to believe that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in the breach of duty (Subsection (2)(b) of Section
3-304)."
What were formerly restrictive indorsements are treated either
as special or blank indorsements with effect given to the language in
the indorsement which made the indorsement restrictive under the
NIL. Subsequent takers can become holders in due course, contrary
to the holdings under the NIL. 16 1 The first indorsee holds the instrument as a fiduciary and is subject to the duties that relationship
imposes. Subsequent holders for value are not affected by the form of
the indorsement unless they have notice of the fiduciary's breach of
duty.
Instruments entering the banking chain for collection, of course,
become subject to Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections.
Presumably, the draftsmen of the Code considered that the rules
respecting special and blank indorsements were sufficiently explicit to
handle "collection" indorsements. Doubt might be expressed, however,
whether this is true as respects such an indorsement as "Pay any Bank
or Banker" which is not referred to in the UCC. Does such an indorsement specify "the person to whom or to whose order" the instrument is payable, and so constitute a special indorsement? Or, does
the indorsement specify "no particular indorsee," and so constitute a
blank indorsement? 162 Perhaps, the net effect of Article 3 and Article
4 taken together will make it unnecessary to decide whether "Pay any
Bank or Banker" and similar indorsements are special or blank.
'See, e.g., Gulbranson Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93
(i91g)-

1

'UCC 3-204. See also UCO 3-102 requiring that an "order" identify the person to pay with reasonable certainty.
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E.

REACQUISITION

An instrument returned or reacquired by a prior party may be
reissued or further negotiated. Intervening parties are discharged
as against the reacquiring party and subsequent holders not in due
course. The reacquiring party may strike any indorsement not necessary to his title, and if he does so, such intervening parties are dis163
charged as to subsequent holders in due course as well.
IV. RIGHTS OF A HOLDER
A.

GENERAL

Every holder of an instrument, whether he is the owner or not,
may transfer or negotiate it, and may discharge it64 or enforce payment in his own name. 65
B.

HOLDER IN DUE COURSE DEFINED

I. General. "Section 3-302. Holder in Due Course.

"(I) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith including observance of the reasonable
commercial standards of any business in which the holder
may be engaged; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person.
"(2) A payee may be a holder in due course.
"(3) A holder does not become a holder in due course of an instrument:
(a) by purchase of it at judicial sale or by taking it under
legal process; or
(b) by acquiring it in taking over an estate; or
(c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular course of business of the transferor.
x'Cf. UCC 3-2o8 with NIL 48 (Va. § 6-400), NIL 50 (Va. § 6-402) and NIL 121
(Va. § 6-474).
MThis statement is limited by UCC 3-6o3 involving claims of third persons to
rights in the instrument.
1
'Cf. UCO 3-3o with NIL 51 (Va. § 6-4o3). See Fleshman v. Bibb, 118 Va.
582, 88 S. E. 64 (i96). Accord: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Bohannan,
141 Va. 285, 127 S. E. 161 (1925). Bank holding under restrictive indorsement
can sue in own name.
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"(4) A purchaser of a limited interest can be a holder in due
course only to the extent of the interest purchased."' 66
2. Taking for Value. "Consideration" and "value" are distinguished throughout the Article on Commercial Paper. "Consideration"
refers to what the obligor has received for his obligation, and is important only on the question of whether his obligation can be enforced
against him. 1 67 "Value" is important only on the question of whether

the holder who has acquired that obligation qualifies as a particular
kind of holder. 68
"Section 3-303. Taking for Value.

"A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien
on the instrument otherwise than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security
for an antecedent claim against any person whether or not
the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an
irrevocable commitment to a third person."
The apparent conflict in the NIL as to whether an executory
promise to give value was itself value is resolved in favor of the view
that it is not value.'0 9 Thus, according to Article 3, the giving of bank
credit not drawn upon and which may be revoked is not a taking for
value.170
However, under UCC 4 -2o8(i)(b) in the Article on Bank Collections
a bank has a security interest in an item, or gives value, when "it has
given credit available for withdrawal as of right ... whether or not

the credit is drawn upon and whether or not there is a right of
charge-back." Whatever may be the meaning of this language it supersedes the provisions of Article 3 relating to value to the extent of any
171
inconsistency.
6Cf. with NIL 52 (Va. § 6-4o4).
"7UCC 3-408, Comment, Point i.
sUCC 3-3o3, Comment, Point 2.
"'Cf. NIL 25 ,(Va. § 6-377) with NIL 54 (Va. § 6-4o6).
"'UCC 3-303, Comment, Point 3. See McAuley v. Morris Plan Bank, 155 Va.
777, 156 S. E. 418 (1931). Bank credit drawn upon constitutes a taking for value.
7
:' UCC 3-103(2) and 4-102(0). Marsh believes that courts could reach the same
conflicting results as to whether bank credit is value under the UCC as under
the NIL. Marsh, supra, 34 Ore. L. Rev. 33, 42. On the other hand, Britton considers that UCC 3o3 (a) and 4-208 codify the rule that bank credit is not value
and the first-in, first-out rule.
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Taking an instrument for collateral security is a taking for value.' 7 2
A taking in payment or as security for an antecedent claim against
any person, whether or not the claim is due, is value.' 73 The language
of the UCC somewhat extends the NIL provisions by providing
that there is a taking for value even though the claim does not arise
out of contract, and is not due, and is a claim against any person.
The UCC explicitly provides that the giving of a negotiable instrument or any irrevocable commitment, as a letter of credit, to a
third person constitutes a taking for value.
This section, it will be noted, applies only to holders, defining
when they take for value. The UCC recognizes that there may be a
transfer for value to a transferee other than a holder. In fact it is
the "transfer for value" that determines whether the transferee is
entitled to the transferor's indorsement. 174 Yet the UCC does not define a transfer for value in that context. Presumably, it would be the
same as when a holder takes the instrument. By analogy, perhaps, the
requirements of a taking for value by a holder could be held applicable
to taking for value by a transferee other than a holder. On the other
hand, the way is open for a court to define "value" differently when
the transfer is to one other than a holder than when it is to a holder.
It would seem that Section 3-3o3 could well be expanded to cover a
transferee's taking an instrument for value instead of limiting the
section to "holders."
3. In Good Faith. Under the NIL the requirements or "good
faith" and "without notice" for due course holding are not entirely

differentiated since a person may have knowledge of such facts that his
action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith.'7 5 Under the
UCC "good faith" means "honesty in fact."' 176 This has been the test
applied by the Virginia court. "The rights of the holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good faith, and not by a
1
-2Accord: Dunnington v. Bank of Crewe, 144 Va. 36, 131 S. E. 221 (1926); Anderson v. Union Bank of Richmond, 117 Va. 1, 83 S. E. io8o (1915); Colona v.
Parksley Nat. Bank, 12o Va. 812, 92 S. E.979 (1917); City Coal and Ice Co., Inc. v.
Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 140 Va. 6oo, 125 S. E. 697 (1924).
1
See Wheeler v. Wardell, 173 Va. 168, 3 S. E. (2d) 377 (1939) (holder in due
course); Colley v. Summers Parrott Hardware Co., 119 Va. 439, 89 S. E. 906 (1916)
(holder, but not in due course, under the NIL); American Bank of Orange v. McComb, 1o5 Va. 473, 54 S. E. 14 (1906) (holder in due course).
'7'UCC 3-201(3 ) .
'rNIL 56 (Va. § 6-408).

'7 0UCC 1-201(19).

34

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XII

speculative issue as to his diligence or negligence."' 177 However, the
UCC also provides that the "good faith" requirement includes the
"observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any business
in which the holder may be engaged." According to the Comment this
provision only makes explicit what has been implicit in the case-law. 178
Fears have been expressed that the change made by the UCC will bring
uncertainty in the law and may even represent the substitution of a
"suspicious circumstances" test for the "honesty in fact" test.' 7 9 It would
seem, however, that a question of fact is presented whenever a purchaser takes an instrument under "suspicious circumstances." Was the
taking in good or bad faith? The UCC provides a serviceable test for
resolving this question of fact as does the NIL. The difficulties arise
80
in applying the test, whatever may be the precise phraseology.
4. Notice to Purchaser. One of the most extensive sections in the
Article on Commercial Paper relates to "Notice." It is intended to
remove uncertainties in existing law.181
5. Notice-Face of the Instrument.
" (i) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if (a) the
Instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of
forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into

question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; ...
"(5) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the
purchaser notice of a defense or claim...
(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser has notice of any improper completion."
1
' Moore v. Potomac Savings Bank, 16o Va. 597, 169 S. E. 922 (193). See also
Ratcliffe v. Costello, 117 Va. 563, 85 S. E. 469 (1915); Stevens v. Clintwood Drug
Co., 155 Va. 353, 154 S. E. 515 (193o).
'18UCC 3-3o2, Comment, Point 1.
1
OBritton, 49 Northw. U. L. R. 417, 430-432; Marsh, supra, 34 Ore. L. Rev. 33,

37 and 451 ' The Virginia court has held that a purchase of instruments at a considerable discount does not show knowledge of such facts as to constitute bad faith.
Moore v. Potomac Savings Bank, 16o Va. 597, 169 S. E. 922 (1933) (notes for $6,ooo
purchased for $5,4oo); Fleshman v. Bibb, 18 Va. 582, 88 S.E. 64 (1916) (notes sold at
discount of 2o per cent on day following execution, at which time maker did not
know of fraud in the transaction); City National Bank of Roanoke, Va. v. Hundley,
112 Va. 51, 70 S. E. 494 (1911) (notes for $2,4oo purchased for $1,750); Crum v.
Hanna, 140 Va. 366, 125 S.E. 219 (1924) (bond for $500 purchased at discount of
$25). However, a makeshift transaction between payee and purchaser for the purpose of cutting off the maker's defenses is not a taking in good faith. Stevens v.
Clintwood Drug Co., 155 Va. 353, 154 S. E. 515 (1930); Duncan v. Carson, 127 Va.
306, 1o3 S.E. 665 (192o) (a transfer from the company to the president was found
not to be in good faith).
msUCC 3-304.
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Under the NIL it is necessary that the holder take an instrument
which is "complete and regular upon its face" in order to be a holder
in due course. 8 2 The UCC eliminates this as a separate requirement
of holder in due course status. Instead, it is treated as a part of the
question of notice to the purchaser.
"The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if the instrument
is so incomplete.., as to call into question its validity, terms or
ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay." Since an
incomplete instrument will necessarily be ambiguous as to its terms
in some respect, it would seem that its terms will always be called into
question so that a purchaser takes with notice of a claim or defense.
If this section should be so construed the net result would be that in
order to be a holder in due course the purchaser would be required
to take an instrument complete on its face, and, probably, without
knowledge that the instrument has been completed after issuance.
On the other hand, under the UCC, knowledge that "an incomplete
instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser has notice of
any improper completion" does not of itself give the purchaser notice
of a defense or claim. Under this provision a purchaser would not
have notice of a defense or claim if he knew that an entire instrument
had been written over a signature.
It would seem that litigation will be inevitable with resultant
conflicts in authority under these provisions which are susceptible of
such extreme interpretation, depending upon which subsection of Section 3-304 is emphasized.

Another ambiguity lies in the phrase "so irregular as to ... create
an ambiguity as to the party to pay." This may mean either an ambiguity as to who is the maker or drawer, or as to who is the payee.
If the latter, the provision is in direct conflict with subsection (5 )(d),
whenever the purchaser takes with knowledge that the instrument has
been completed by filling in the payee's name. The word "such"
in the clause "bears such visible evidence of forgery or alteration"
carries the unfortunate connotation that something more than visible
evidence of forgery or alteration is required.
6. Notice-a Defense. The UCC states that apart from incomplete
and irregular instruments,
'-NIL 52 (Va. § 6-404(l)). See American Bank of Orange v. McComb, 1o5 Va.
473, 54 S. E. 14 (19o6). Instrument complete and regular on its face although
materially altered by addition of words "Payable with Interest."
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"(i) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if...
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party
is voidable in whole or in part, or that all parties have been
discharged."
A purchaser under the UCC "has notice of a claim or defense if...
the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable
in whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged." Under
this section notice of any defense prevents the holder from being a
holder in due course and subjects him to all claims and defenses. This
would change the result in Moore v. Potomac Savings Bank. 83 In
this case a payee fraudulently secured notes from the maker. The payee
then transferred them to a bank as security for a loan at a usurious
rate of interest. The Virginia court held that the bank could recover
against the maker since it was "not charged with knowledge of defect
in title to the notes in question because it discounted them at a
greater rate of interest than that allowed lenders... ,"s4 Under the
UCC, notice of the bank that the obligation of the payee was voidable
in part, that is, as respects usurious interest, would seem to be notice
of the defense of the maker, so that no recovery could be had on the
notes.
Although purporting to define notice this section does not do so,
since it defines notice in terms of notice. "The purchaser has notice ...
if the purchaser has notice..." Whether notice requires actual knowledge, or only "reasonable grounds to believe" as in UCC 3-304(2),
is not made clear.
A holder may become a holder in due course as respects some
parties on the instrument and not as respects others. This occurs when
he takes the instrument with notice of the discharge of some, but not
all of the parties. He takes subject to the defenses of the party discharged, but not subject to defenses of other parties or claims to the
instrument. 8 5
7. Notice-A Claim. The UCC states that apart from incomplete
and irregular instruments,
"(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument
when he has reasonable grounds to believe
(a) that the transfer to him is a preference voidable under
the law of bankruptcy or insolvency;
=16o Va. 597, 169 S. E. 922 (1933).
'8 Id. at 6o5 . Although District of Columbia law governed the case the court
considered D. C. law to be the same as that of Virginia. See also Fischer v. Lee,
98 Va. 159, 35 S. E. 441 (19oo).
2'See UCC 3-6o, Comment, Point 2.
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(b) that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach of duty."
"(5) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the
purchaser notice of a defense or claim....
(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a
fiduciary; ...
Somewhat surprisingly this UCC section does not undertake to
state when a purchaser has notice of a "claim," since the two isolated
situations covered in UCC 3-304(2) can hardly be considered an exclusive listing. As respects the two listed, "reasonable grounds to believe" gives notice of a claim. Is the same test applicable to notice
of other claims or is "actual knowledge" required? Although under
UCC 3-304(2) notice of the specified claims does not give notice of defenses, it would seem that this result is required under the definition of holder in due course. A holder cannot be a holder in due course
if he has notice of "any defense... or claim....,186
Knowledge that a fiduciary is negotiating the instrument does not
alone give notice of a defense or claim.18 7 Subsection 2(b) is intended
to carry out the policy underlying Section 6 of the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act specifying when the purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument because of reasonable grounds for believing the fiduciary
is committing a breach of trust.188 Since UCC 3-304 (2)(b) is limited to
claims only, knowledge by a purchaser of actual misconduct by a fiduciary in one respect, that is committing a breach of trust, carries no
implication and is not notice to a purchaser that the fiduciary has
misconducted himself otherwise, as by fraudulently securing negotiable
instruments from a maker. This position seems somewhat inconsistent
with that of UCC 3-304 (1) under which notice of any defense is notice
of all defenses and claims.
8. Notice-Instrument Overdue. The purchaser of an instrument in
fact overdue or dishonored may be a holder in due course if he takes
1 " UCC 3-302 (1)(c).
2Accord: Trust Company of Norfolk v. Snyder, 152 Va. 572, 147 S. E. 234 (1929);

Cocke's Administrator v. Loyall, 150 Va. 336, 143 S. E. 881 (1928).
2Accord: Sawyer v. National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, Virginia, 166 Va.
439, i86 S. E. 1 (1936). Notes showed that payee was trustee in deed of trust. Purchaser knew payee was unable to meet financial obligations, that he habitually
lent money for his mother-in-law, and took note in exchange for another note as
security for payee's personal indebtedness to bank. Chase & Co. v. Norfolk National Bank of Commerce and Trusts, 151 Va. 1o4o, 145 S. E. 725 (1928). Check
drawn by agent of company with bank as payee deposited to agent's personal account. Bank held liable to company.
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without notice that it is overdue or dishonored. 8 9 A purchaser has
notice that an instrument is overdue if he has reasonable grounds
to believe that any part of the principal is overdue, or there is an unsecured default in payment of another instrument in the same series,
or that an acceleration has been made, or that he is taking a demand
instrument after demand has been made or more than a reasonable
length of time from its issue. A reasonable length of time for checks
drawn and payable in the United States is presumed to be thirty days. 190
Knowledge of a default in payment of interest or in payment of any
other instrument not of the same series is not of itself notice of a
defense or claim, 191 which according to the Comment means that
it is not notice that the instrument is overdue. 92 There thus seems to
be a conflict between text and comment as to "what it is that notice
of default in interest does not give notice of-that the instrument is
overdue or that there is a claim or defense." Knowledge of either
would bar the purchaser as a holder in due course.
9. Notice-other. Purchasers of instruments conditionally indorsed
or indorsed in such a manner as to prohibit further negotiation, except when in the course of bank collections, have notice of a claim
against the instrument.193 A purchaser does not have notice of a defense or claim from the fact alone that an instrument is antedated or
postdated; that it is issued or negotiated in return for an executory
promise, or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms thereof; or that any party signed for accommodation.' 9 4 Filing or recording a document does not of itself constitute notice to a person who
would otherwise be a holder in due course. 95 Presumably the Virginia view that a purchaser is not charged with notice of the powers
contained in a corporation charter would follow under the UCC, but
the point is not made explicit.1 96 To be effective, notice must be received at such time and in such manner as to give a reasonable oppor97
tunity to act on it.1

mUCC 3-302()(c).

"OCf. UCC 3-304 (4) with NIL 52(2) (Va. § 6-404(2)) and NIL 45 (Va. § 6-397).
mUCC 3- 04( )(M.
3 5
2-UCC 3-304, Comment, Point 8.
'"UCC 3-304(3).
"'UCC 3-3o4(5)(a)(b)(c).

'-UCC 3-304(6).
"'City Coal and Ice Company, Inc. v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 140 Va.

600, 125 S. E. 697 (1924).
'7UCC 3-304(7).
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1o. "A payee May be a Holder in Due Course." With this direct
approach the UCC resolves the conflict in the cases on the question. 9 8s
According to the Comment:

"The position here taken is that the payee may become a holder
in due course to the same extent and under the same circumstances as any other holder. This is true whether he takes the
instrument by purchase from a third person or directly from the
obligor. All that is necessary is that the payee meet the requirements of this section."
The full implications of this provision of the UCC are not immediately apparent. The difficulty under the NIL of holding that a
payee was a holder in due course arose from the requirement in
NIL 52 (Va. Sec. 6-4o4) that the instrument be "negotiated" to the
holder, and under NIL 3o (Va. Sec. 6-382) the negotiation of an
order instrument seems to require the "indorsement of the holder."
When faced with the problem the Virginia court held that the definition of negotiation in the NIL was not exclusive and a payee could take
by negotiation. 199 Although the definition of negotiation in the UCC is
broad enough to cover a transfer to a payee, 200 the UCC draftsmen have
not followed this approach, but instead simply abolished any requirement that a holder in due course take by negotiation. 201 So that a
holder in due course, and a fortiori, a holder, does not have to take
an instrument by negotiation. What significance remains to the term
"negotiation" is difficult to see.
Even more troublesome, however, is the fact that the UCC
provides that the payee dealing directly with the maker may be a
holder in due course if he meets the requirement of holding in due
course. As a result, in an action by the payee against the maker, by
the provisions of UCC 3-307 the maker has the burden of alleging
and proving a defense and the payee-holder has the burden of proving he has no notice of the defense.
The situation is especially confusing when want or failure of consideration is the defense. "'Consideration' refers to what the obligor
has received for his obligation, and is important only on the question
of whether his obligation can be enforced against him." 202 "Value" is
important "only on the question of whether the holder who has acmUCC 3-302(a).
"National Bank of Suffolk v. American Bank and Trust Co. 63 Va. 71o, 177
S. E. 229 (1934).
- UCC 3-202(1).
201
UCC 3-302, Comment, Point 3.
2UCC 3-408, Comment, Point x, and UCC 3-303, Comment, Point 2.
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203
quired that obligation qualifies as a particular kind of holder.1
Since in an action by the payee against the maker what the payee
gave is what the maker received, it does not seem as though the draftsmen have in fact achieved their purpose of drawing a comprehensive
204
distinction between value and consideration.

The broad view of the UCG draftsmen that a payee taking an
instrument from the obligor may meet the requirements of due
course holding is not necessary since the problem under the NIL
arose when the payee did not deal directly with the maker, but
through a third person. And it is examples of this type that are
given in the UCC Comment. 20 5 Is this third person the agent of the
maker or the payee? Is the knowledge of this third person to be imputed to his principal?206 This has always been the real problem and
it remains unchanged under the UCC for UCC 3-305(2) provides:
"To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from ... all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt...."
Controversy will now concentrate on this underlined provision. Have
the parties dealt with each other or not?
i.i. Who Are Not Holders in Due Course. The UCC undertakes
to state existing case law as to situations in which the purchaser takes
an instrument under unusual circumstances which indicate he is a
successor in interest to the prior holder and does not acquire holder in
due course status. These situations are: by purchase at judicial sale,
taking under legal process, taking over an estate, or purchasing as part
of a bulk transaction not in regular course of business of the transferor. 207 The latter has particular application to the purchase by one
bank of a substantial part of the paper held by another bank which is
threatened with insolvency and seeking to liquidate its assets. 208 This
was the situation in Beach v. Bank of Pocahontas20 and the UCC
states the result of that case.
The purchaser of a limited interest, as a security interest, acquires
holder in due course status only to the extent of the interest pur210
chased.
2UCC
2"UCC
"wUCC
NState

3-303,
3-303,
3-302,
Bank

Comment, Point 2.
Comment, Point 2, and UCC 3-408, Comment, Point i.
Comment, Point 3.
of Pamplin v. Payne, 156 Va. 837, 159 S. E. 163 (1931).

2UCC 3-302(3).
a UCC 3-302, Comment, Point 4.
2157
Va. 274, 16o S. E. 68 (1931).
2"Cf. UCC 3-302(4) with NIL 27 (Va. § 6-379).
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C.

RIGHTS OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE

A holder in due course takes the instrument free from the claims of
any person and the defenses of any party with whom the holder has
not dealt, except infancy, incapacity, duress, illegality, fraud in the
factum, discharge in insolvency proceedings, and any other discharge
of which the holder has notice when he takes the instrument. The
real defense of nondelivery of an incomplete instrument provided in
211
Section 15 (Va. Sec. 6-367) has been eliminated.
Real defenses remain, under the UCC, good defenses as against a
holder in due course. The extent to which infancy, incapacity, duress,
and illegality are real defenses is left to be determined by the law of
each state. The UCC, however, undertakes to define "fraud in the factum" as a real defense. In order for fraud to be available as a defense
against a holder in due course, the fraud must constiute "such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with neither
knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
212
character or its essential terms."
Although a real defense based on infancy remains under the UCC,
a claim based on infancy is not good against a holder in due course,
since he takes free of all valid claims on the part of any person. 213
This provision would change the result in Strother v. Lynchburg
2 14
Trust and Savings Bank.
Negotiation is effective to transfer an instrument although made
by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or any other person without capacity, or although the instrument was obtained by
fraud, duress, mistake, in an illegal transaction, or in breach of duty,2 15
and even though the transaction is entirely void as to such person. 216
In the Strother case the lands of an infant were sold under decree of court, the court directing that coupon bonds be taken in payf'Cf.UCC 3-305 with NIL 15 (Va. § 6-367), 16 (Va. § 6-368), and 57 (Va. §
6-4o9). Accord: Early v. Citizens Bank, 173 Va. 436, 3 S. E. (2d) 167 (1939) (conditional
delivery); City Coal and Ice Co., Inc. v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 140 Va.
600, 125 S. E. 697 (1924) (ultra vires); Hawkes v. Bowles, 19 Va. 108, 89 S. E. 93
(916)

(fraud); Duncan v. Broadway National Bank, 127 Va. 34, 102 S. E. 577 (1920)

(failure of consideration and fraud); Anderson v. Union Bank of Richmond, 117
Va. 1, 83 S. E. io8o (igi5) (payment); Lynchburg National Bank v. Scott Brothers,
91 Va. 652, 22 S. E. 487 (1895) (usury).
2"UCC 3-305(2)(c).
OUCC 3-3o06(a).
2"155 Va. 826, 156 S. E. 426, 73 A. L. R. 66 (1931)- UCC 3-.207.

'OId., Comment, Point i.
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ment and delivered to the infant when he reached his majority. The
Commissioner appointed to make the conveyance procured the infant's indorsement on the bonds and pledged them as collateral to a
bank to secure his personal loan. On reaching his majority the infant endeavored to disaffirm his indorsement and recover the bonds
from the bank. The Virginia court held that the infant's indorsement,
under the NIL, was effective so that a negotiation of the bonds ensued, but that the transfer could be disaffirmed and the infant could
recover back the bonds even from the holder in due course.
Under the UCC the infant would have a defense in an action
brought against him on his contract of indorsement, but his claim to
recover the bonds would be cut off by a holder in due course. Whether
the result reached by the Virginia court or the one that would be
reached under the UCC is more desirable seems debatable since the
equities involved are so nearly in balance. Nevertheless, certain implications of the UCC position may well be considered.
Could the infant recover back the money if he disaffirmed after the
holder in due course has collected on the instrument from the maker?
It would seem not, if the purpose of the rule is to be given effect.
Yet does not this present the anomalous situation of a negotiable
instrument having greater currency than cash itself? If an infant enters into a voidable transaction with a party who does not know of his
infancy and pays cash, the transaction can be disaffirmed and the cash
recovered back. But if the infant in the same transaction gives a negotiable instrument, whether his own or that of another person, it cannot be recovered back, for under UCC 3-305(1) a holder in due course
takes an instrument free of all claims to it on the part of any person,
and not just the claims of persons other than the party with whom he
dealt. If the person with whom the infant dealt transfers the instrument to a third person or cashes the infant's check, can the infant then
disaffirm and recover back the proceeds? To allow this would seem to
defeat the policy underlying the UCC provisions on the subject. Yet not
to allow it would mean that a person is better protected when he takes
a negotiable instrument than when he takes cash from an infant.
D. RIGHTS OF ONE NOT HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Unless a person qualifies as a holder in due course in his own
right or by transfer from a holder in due course he takes an instrument subject to all valid claims on the part of any person, and all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a simple
contract, including want or failure of consideration, nonperformance
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of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose. He also takes subject to the defense that he or a person through
whom he holds the instrument acquired it by theft.
A party liable on the instrument cannot himself assert as a defense
the claim of any third person, except that the instrument was acquired
217
by theft, unless the third person himself defends the action.
The UCC continues the rule of the NIL that as against a party
other than a holder in due course nondelivery, or a conditional delivery, or a delivery for a special purpose only may be shown as
a defense. 218 The UCC makes explicit, however, that conditional delivery refers only to a condition precedent, 19 and not to a condition
subsequent.2 20 The UCC does not endeavor to distinguish a condition that is precedent from one that is subsequent.
E. PROCEDURE
221
i.Burden of Establishing Signatures,Defenses and Due Course.
"Burden of establishing" under the UCC means "the burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more prob22 2
able than its non-existence."

"(i) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature on an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of
a signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming
under the signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized

except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who has died or become incompetent before

proof is required."
=1Cf. UCC 3-3o6 with NIL 16 (Va. § 6-368) , 28 (Va. § 6-38o), 58 (Va. § 6-410),
and 59 (Va. § 6-411). See discussion of Stegal v. Union Bank and Federal Trust Co.,
supra, at 7.
"Cf. UCC 3-306(c) with NIL 16 (Va. § 6-368).
-1D
Accord: Robertson v. Viriginia National Bank, 135 Va. s66, 115 S. E. 536 (1923).
Evidence admissible under parole evidence rule that indorsement not to be operative
until another party indorsed.
-°Accord: Clark v. Miller, 148 Va. 83, 92 S.E. 556 (1927) and Continental
Trust Co. v. Witt, 139 Va. 458, 124 S.E. 265 (1924) (oral evidence that instruments
not to be paid under certain circumstances held inadmissible under parol evidence
rule); Barrett v. Vaughan & Co., 163 Va. 811, 178 S.E. 64 (1935) and Crafts v.
Broadway National Bank of Richmond, Va., 142 Va. 702, 128 S. E. 364 (1925) (oral
evidence that collateral would be exhausted before the note .was enforced held
inadmissible under parol evidence rule).
-"Cf. UCC 3-307 with NIL 59 (Va. § 6-411).
22UCC 1-2o1(8).
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Although not covered by the NIL, under Va. Section 8-114 signatures are admitted unless "denied by an affidavit accompanying the
plea putting it in issue." Virginia practice only requires that the
genuineness of the signature be put in issue; the UCC requires that
the effectiveness of the signature be specifically denied. The UCC does
not require verification, which is now required in Virginia.
In Hillman v. Cornett223 it was held that once a signature was put

in issue by the pleadings, the burden of proving the signature is on the
plaintiff and "in the absence of any evidence of the genuineness of
the signature... judgment should have been given for the defendant."224 This rule would be changed for under the UCC the party
claiming under a signature is aided by a "presumption .... Presumption' or 'presumed' means that the trier of fact must find the existence
of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which
would support a finding of its nonexistence." 22 5 So, under the UCC
the party denying a signature must make a sufficient showing in support of the denial as would support a finding in his favor before
the plaintiff is required to produce any evidence, with the presumption requiring a finding for the plaintiff. Once such evidence is introduced the burden of establishing the signature by a preponderance of the total evidence is on the plaintiff.226 The exception in

the UCC with reference to the denial of signatures of a dead person or
an incompetent, in which case there is no presumption that the signature is genuine or authorized, would seem to be in accord with Virginia law as to all cases in which signatures are denied.
If the UCC is adopted in Virginia, it would seem desirable to
amend Va. Section 8-114 so as to exclude cases falling under UCC
3-307(1)(a), the latter being inconsistent with the interpretation placed

on Va. Section 8-114.
When signatures are admitted or established, production of the
instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense. 227 This is in accord with the Virginia law as stated
in Holdsworthv. Anderson Drug Co. 228 A transferee who is not a holder by establishing his right to the instrument, accounting for the
absence of any necessary indorsement, establishes that he has the rights
=137

Va. 2oo,

119

S. E. 74

(1923).

2'Id. at 203.
-UCC

1-201(31).

2'-UCC 3-307, Comment, Point i.
22VUCC
3-30700
(b).S. E. 565 (i9i6).
=Si8 Va.
359, 87
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of a holder and is entitled to recover unless the defendant establishes
229
a defense.
The defendant has the burden of introducing evidence of a defense and of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence.23 0 In the
light of this provision no explicit reference is made to every negotiable instrument being deemed prima fade to have been issued for a
valuable consideration.23 ' The burden of establishing want or failure
of consideration is on the defendant.2 32 The plaintiff may recover on an
instrument, without introducing any evidence, even though the defendant has introduced some evidence of a defense.2 33 If the plaintiff
endeavors to meet the defense by establishing that he has the rights
of a holder in due course, he must do so by introducing and establishing by a preponderance of the evidence each element of due course
holding, that is, that he or a prior party took the instrument for value,
2 34
in good faith and without notice.
V-LIABILITY OF PARTIES
A.

SIGNATURES

i. Form. Under both the NIL and the UCC it is provided that no

person is liable on a negotiable instrument unless his signature appears thereon. 23 5 Without specific reference to any section of the
NIL the Virginia court held in Parksley National Bank v. Chandler's
2UCC 3-307, Comment, Point 2.
23UCC 3-307(2). Accord: Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 96 S. E. 845 (1918)
(Semble).
mNIL 24 (Va. § 6-376). See Murphy's Hotel Company, Inc. v. Herndon's Administrator, 12o Va. 505, 91 S. E. 634 (1937); Reid v. Windsor, iii Va. 825, 69 S. E.
11o (1g1). See also Brenard Manufacturing Co. v. Brown, 12o Va. 757, 92 S. E.
850 (1917); Ford v. Engleman, 118 Va. 89, 86 S. E. 852 (1915), to the effect that
want or failure of consideration is a defense.
-Accord: Trevillian v. Bullock, 185 Va. 958, 40 S.E. (2d) 92o (1947); Bernard
Smith Co. v. Bernard, 124 Va. 518, 98 S. E. 677 (1919). In Good v. Dyer, 137 Va.
114, 119 S. E. 277 (1923) the trial court appears to have given inconsistent instructions on the burden of proof on the defense of want of consideration. A verdict
for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. It is not entirely clear from the opinion as
to which party has the burden of establishing want or failure of the consideration as
a defense. This case is not cited in Trevillian v. Bullock.
2mUCC 3-307, Comment, Point 2.
2'UCC 3-307(3) and Comment, Point 3. Accord: Elkhart State Bank v. Bristol
Broom Company, 143 Va. 1, 129 S. E. 371 (1925); Piedmont Bank v. Hatcher, 94
Va. 229, 26 S.E. 505 (1897); Moore v. Potomac Savings Bank, 16o Va. 597, 169 S.E.
922 (1933).
13

2 Cf. UCC 3-4o1 with NIL 18 (Va. § 6-370).
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Admr's 236 that an oral guaranty of payment of a note was enforceable

against the guarantor, the Statute of Frauds being satisfied. The Comment in the UCC states that this result remains unchanged.
A signature may be made by using any name, including a trade
2
or assumed name, and may be by a mark.

37

A signature is an indorsement unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is made in some other capacity.235 In Colona v.
Parksley National Bank239 the Virginia court held that certain sig-

natures on the face of a note were made in the capacity of indorsers
and not makers. This result might have been reached from an examination of the instrument alone. However, the court appears also to
have permitted parole evidence to show the intention of the parties.
According to the Comment to the UCC, "Parole evidence is not
admissible to show any other capacity" than indorsement. "The question is to be determined from the face of the instrument alone, and
unless the instrument itself makes it clear that he has signed in some
other capacity the signer must be treated as an indorser." 240 Literally
construed the UCC comment would not permit the introduction of
parole evidence to show that a person signed in a capacity other
than an indorser, but would permit parole evidence to show that the
person signed as indorser, which was the situation in the Colona case.
Although susceptible of this construction the Comment probably
is intended to mean that parole evidence is inadmissible in either
event, and the capacity in which a party signs must be determined
solely from the face of the instrument.
A signature may be made by an agent or other authorized representative and his authority established as in other cases of representation. No particular form of appointment is necessary.2 41 An authorized representative who signs his own name is personally liable unless
the instrument shows the name of the person represented and shows
that the signature is made in a representative capacity.242 "The name
of an organization preceded or followed by the name and office
of an authorized individual is a signature made in -a representative
=17o Va. 394, 196 S. E. 676 (1938).
"'Cf. UCC 3-4O with NIL 18 (Va. § 6-370).
='Cf. UCC 3-402 with NIL 17(6) (Va. § 6-369(6)) and NIL 63 (Va. § 6-415).
in 1 20 Va. 812, 92 S. E. 979 (1917).

3-4o2, Comment.
"OUCO
-41Cf. UCC 3-403(1) with NIL '9 (Va. § 6-371).
-'4Cf. UCC 3-403(2) with NIL 2o (Va. § 6-372). Accord: Hawthorne v. Austin
Organ Co., 71 F. 2d 945 (4th Cir. 1934).
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capacity."2 43 This provision of the Code would leave unchanged the
result in Coal River Collieries v. Eureka Coal and Wood Co., 244 in

which the president's signature followed that of the corporation, but
without revealing the "office" of the signer. The UCC eliminates NIL
21 (Va. Sec. 6-373 dealing with signatures by procuration as involving a practice unknown in the United States.
2. Unauthorized Signatures. An unauthorized signature, under
the UCC, is one "made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery. '2 3 Any unauthorized signature is
wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it.246 The UCC takes
the position, however, that an unauthorized signature operates as
the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor of any person who
in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for value. 247 The UCC
settles a conflict by providing that an unauthorized signature may be
ratified for all purposes of the Article on Commercial Paper, including relieving the unauthorized signer from liability on his signature.
Such ratification does not affect the rights of the person ratifying
against the actual signer nor the provisions of the Criminal Law.248
3.Imposters: FictitiousPayees.249 The UCC has adopted a new approach to the problem of impostors and fictitious payees, providing
as follows:
"Section 3-4o5. Impostors; Signatures in Name of Payee.

"(i) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named
payee is effective if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced
-'3UCC 3-403(2).
-"144 Va. 263, 132 S. E. 337 (1926).
"-'UCC1-201(43).

"UCC 3-4040). Accord: Central National Bank of Richmond v. First and
Merchants National Bank of Richmond, 171 Va. 289, 198 S. E. 883 (1938); Hillman
V. Cornett, 187 Va. 2oo, 119 S. E. 74 (1923); Pettyjohn v. National Exchange Bank of
Lynchburg, ioi Va. 111, 43 S. E. 203 (0o3)

(silence must amount to bad faith in

order to preclude the person whose name has been forged from denying his signature). See also Shepherd v. Mortgage Security Corporation of America, 139 Va.
274, 123 S.E. 553 (1924) (defendant's signature forged as maker, but genuine as indoser, held liable to bona fide purchaser on indorsement).
"47UCC 3-404(1).
"UCC 3-404(2).

-'°Note, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 Yale L. J. 417-78 (1953);
Note, Defrauding Agents and the NIL, 2 Drake L. Rev. 70-75 (1953); Note, Fictitious
Payee and the Uniform Commercial Code, x8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 281-93 (1951).
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the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his
confederate in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument, or
(c) an agent or employee of the drawer has supplied him
with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no
such interest."
"(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil
liability of the person so indorsing."
The UCC abolishes any distinction between instruments secured
to the order of specific payees by impostors acting through the mails
and acting face-to-face, adopting the rule that has generally prevailed
in the face-to-face situations. Imposture, according to the Comment,
refers to impersonation and does not include a false representation
that the party is the authorized agent of the payee. "The drawer who
takes the precaution of making the instrument payable to the princi250
pal is entitled to have his indorsement.
Whereas under the NIL, instruments payable to fictitious payees
were bearer instruments, not requiring indorsements, 251 the UCC
provides that they are order instruments so that indorsements are
necessary to negotiation. However, indorsements.by any person are
25
effective. Thus, the result reached in Norton v. City Bank & Trust Co. 2
would remain unchanged, but the result would be reached by a different road under the UCC.
Subsection (i)(b) restates the substance of NIL 9(3) (Va. Sec.
6-361(3)) but limits its application to drafts only. Subsection (i)(c),
which likewise is limited to drafts, changes NIL 9(3) in substantially
the same was as many states have done, but not Virginia. Under the
NIL an instrument is payable to a fictitious or non-existing person only
if such fact, that is, that the ostensible payee is to have no interest
in the instrument, is known to the person making it so payable.
Under the UCC this rule is expanded to include situations when an
agent or employee of the drawer has supplied the drawer with the
name of the payee, the agent or employee intending that the payee
shall have no interest in the proceeds, while the actual drawer is
deceived, believing that he is making a draft payable to a real payee.
5UCC 3-4o5, Comment, Point 2.
27NIL

9(3) (Va. § 6-361(3)).

2=e94 Fed. 839 (4th Cir. 1923).
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B.

ALTERATION

i. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Unauthorized Signature. By a new provision the UCC adopts the doctrine of Young v.
Grote.253 Any person whose negligence substantially contributes to a
material alteration or an unauthorized signature is precluded from
asserting the alteration or unauthorized signature against a holder in
due course, a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good
faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards
of his business. 25 4 A duty of care is thus imposed on persons making
negotiable instruments, but no effort is made to define negligence.
Negligence has usually been found where spaces have been left in the
body of the instrument in which words or figures may be inserted. 25
The section is not intended to require any unusual precautions as
the use of sensitized paper, indelible ink, or protectograph. The
section is to extend to situations in which a party has notice of
forgeries of his signature and is negligent in failing to prevent further
forgeries and negligently mailing an instrument to the wrong person
256
with the same name as the payee.

Alteration. The UCC substitutes a general definition for material alteration in place of the list of illustrations contained in the
NIL.25 7 An alteration is material which "changes the contract of any,
party thereto in any respect," including a change in the number or
relations of the parties, 25 8 unauthorized completion of an incomplete instrument, or adding to or removing any part of the writing
259
as signed.
The severe rule contained in NIL 124 (Va. Sec. 6-477) that an in2.

'4 Bing. 253 (1827).
' UCC 3-406.
2Hoffman v. Planters National Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E. 134 (19oi) suggests

that the maker of a note who leaves spaces through careless execution of the
instrument might be held liable on the instrument. The Code takes this view as
to drafts, but not as respects notes. It is not entirely clear under the Code whether
the same rule might be applied to notes, by analogy, or whether the limitation in
the UCC to Code is intended to he exclusive.
2NationaI Bank of Virginia v. Nolting, 94 Va. 263, 26 S. E. 826 (1897). Young
v. Grote not applicable where check given a stranger in return for cash.
2-rCf. UCC 3-407 with NIL 125 (Va. § 6-478).
2Accord: Hoffman v. Planters National Bank, 99 Va. 48o, 39 S. E. 134 (191o)
(change in name of payee).
':,Accord: Harnsberger v. Nicholas, 176 Va. 255, 1o S. E. (2d) 873 (1940) (changing
due date from so years after date to i year after date); Stegel v. Union Bank
Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 176 S. E. 438 (1934) (notation that interest has been paid not
a material alteration).
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strument that has been materially altered without the assent of
all parties is avoided as against prior parties except as against a party
who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration is
changed in the UCC. To have any effect under the UCG the alteration must be both fraudulent and material and be made by a
holder, spoliation not affecting the holder. Even then only a party
whose contract is thereby changed, and who has not assented or is not
-precluded from setting up the defense is discharged.2 60 Otherwise, the
instrument can be enforced according to its original tenor, or as respects incomplete instruments according to the authority given.
A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor 201 and when an incomplete
instrument has been completed he may enforce it either as completed
or according to the authority given.
In Harnsbergerv. Nicholas,262 an innocent material alteration was
held to avoid the instrument, but recovery could still be had on the
underlying obligation. Under the UCC this result would be reached directly by allowing recovery on the instrument according to its original
tenor.
C. ACCEPTANCES
i. General. An acceptance, under the UCC, "is the drawee's
signed engagement to honor the draft as presented. '263 The acceptance
must be written on the draft under the UCC, thus eliminating the
"virtual" or "collateral" acceptances provided for in the NIL.2 64 However, the UCC provides that liability in contract, tort, or otherwise arising from any letter of credit or other obligation or representation is not
affected.2 65 The front door having been closed on the "virtual acceptance," this provision may leave the back door ajar to its reception 266 The UCC has eliminated NIL 137 (Va. Sec. 6-49o), under which
21Accord: Hoffman v. Planters National Bank, 99 Va. 480, 39 S. E. 134 (1901)
(alteration of name of payee is a material alteration changing the relations of the
parties as respects the maker).
2'Accord: American Bank of Orange v. McComb, 1o5 Va. 473, 54 S. E. 14
(1906).
=176 Va. 255, 19 S. E. (2d) 873 (1940).
2 3
1 Cf. UCC 3-41o0() with NIL 132 (Va. § 6-485) and 191 (Va. § 6-544).
2'NIL 134 (Va. § 6-487) and 135 (Va. § 6-488). See Jones v. Crumpler, 119
Va. 143, 89 S. E. 232 (1916). NIL 133 (Va. § 6-486) has also been eliminated; under
this section a holder could require an acceptance on the bill and treat a refusal to so
accept as a dishonor.
26UCC 3-409(2) and UCC 3-41o, Comment, Point 3.
-wAs respects innocent material alterations the UCC opens the front door to
recovery on the instrument.
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some courts held that a drawee retaining an instrument more
than twenty-four hours accepted it by "retention." 267 A signature
alone is a sufficient acceptance under the Code, whereas the NIL
somewhat ambiguously referred to an acceptance as being "in writing
and signed by the drawee."'26
A draft may be accepted although it has not been signed by the
drawer, or is otherwise incomplete, or is overdue, or has been dishonored.269 Where the draft is payable after sight and the acceptor
fails to date his acceptance the holder may complete it by supplying
a date in good faith.2 70 An acceptance becomes operative when com2 71
pleted by delivery or notification.
The UCC abolishes the "qualified acceptance." 272 The holder may
refuse any proferred acceptance that varies the draft in any manner
and treat the draft as dishonored, in which case the drawee is entitled to have his acceptance cancelled. 273 The holder may assent to
an acceptance that varies the draft which will be effective against the
acceptor, but by doing so the holder discharges each drawer or indorser who does not affirmatively assent, changing the NIL under
which silence is deemed an assent.2 74 Under the UCC, however, a draft
is not varied by an acceptance to pay at any bank in continental United
States; under the NIL an acceptance was unqualified if it was to pay
at a particular place anywhere, "unless it expressly states that the bill
27 5
is to be paid there only and not elsewhere."
2. Certification of Checks. The certification of a check under the
UCC is an acceptance instead of the "equivalent of acceptance" as
under the NIL.2 7 6 The rule of NIL 188 (Va. Sec. 6-542) that a certification procured by the holder discharges the drawer and prior indorsers is continued. According to the Comment an indorsement with
-'6Under UCC 3-419(i)(a) a refusal to return the instrument on demand constitutes a conversion.
-"NIL 132 (Va. § 6-485).
2
Cf. UCC 3-410(l) with NIL 138 (Va. § 6-491).
zOCf. UCC 3-41o(3) changing NIL 138 (Va. § 6-491), last sentence, which uses
the date of first presentment in the absence of agreement to the contrary. The
Comment to the UCC says parole evidence is inadmissible to show an agreement not
written on the draft.
-'This is implied in NIL 191 (Va. § 6-544).
-'Cf. UCC 3-412 with NIL 139 (Va. § 6-492), 14o (Va. § 6-493), and NIL 141
(Va. § 6-494).
-'Cf.
UCC 3-412(1) with NIL 142 (Va. §6-495).
"'NIL 142 (Va. § 6-495).
"7NIL 140 (Va. § 6-493).
2"Cf. UCC 3-411(1)

with NIL 187 (Va. § 6-541).
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the words "after certification" will continue the indorser's liability even
after the holder obtains certification. The UCC states the generally
accepted rule that a bank has no obligation to certify a check unless otherwise agreed, in which case it may be liable for breach of
the agreement. 27 7 Recognizing banking practice, the UCC provides

that "A bank may certify a check before returning it for lack of
proper indorsement. If it does so the drawer is discharged."2 78 This
protects the drawer from a continuing contingent liability.2

79

3.Drafts as Assignments. Article 3 of the UCC, like the NIL, provides that a check or other draft does not in itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee, 280 so that the
drawee is not liable to the holder for dishonor.28 ' The drawee is not
liable until he accepts the instrument, as by the certification of a
282
check.
Section 2-5o6(1) of the Article on Sales provides that "A financing
agency by making payment or advances against a draft which relates to a shipment of goods acquires to that extent the shipper's
rights in the goods and his right to have the draft honored by the
buyer..." The Comment does not make clear what is meant by the

seller's "right to have the draft honored by the buyer." The provision
could mean that a draft drawn by a seller on a buyer of goods operates
as an assignment, so that the scope of UCC 3-411 in Article 3 would
be limited.
D. CONTRACTS OF PARTIES
i. Maker, Drawer and Acceptor. The contract of maker, drawer,
and acceptor are substantially the same under the UCC as under the
NIL. Both maker and acceptor engage to pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his engagement. The UCC resolves a
conflict in the cases under the NIL as to whether the acceptor engages
to pay an instrument as originally drawn, or if altered, according to
283
its tenor at the time of his acceptance. The latter view is accepted.

2--UCC
3"411(2).
"UCC 3-411(3).
-'Id., Comment, Point 3.
mCf. UCC 3-4o9(1) with NIL 127 (Va. § 6-480) and 189 (Va. § 6-543). Accord:
Gardner v. Moore's Administrator, 122 Va. 10, 94 S. E. 162 (1917); Jones v. Crumpler,
iig Va. 143, 89 S. E. 232 (1916); Baltimore 8- Ohio Railroad Co. v. First National
Bank, 1o2 Va. 753, 47 S. E. 837 (1904).
21

"Reaves Warehouse Corp. v. Easley, i5o Va. 236, 142 S. E. 356 (1928).
2Accord: National Mechanics Bank v. Schmelz National Bank, 136 Va. 33,
116 S. E. 38o (1923).

2mCf. UCC 3-413(1) with NIL 6o (Va. § 6-412) and 61 (Va. § 6-413).

1955]

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

A drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and the taking of
the necessary steps of diligence he will pay the draft. This liability may
284
be disclaimed by drawing without recourse.
In any of the above contracts the party admits as against subsequent
parties, including a drawee, the existence of the payee and his then
capacity to indorse.
2. Indorser. Under the UCC, as under the NIL, by indorsement
the indorser engages that upon dishonor, if the necessary steps of diligence are taken, he will pay the holder according to the tenor of the
instrument at the time of his indorsement.28 5 Under the UCC this
contract runs in favor of any subsequent indorser who takes up the
instrument, even though he was not obliged to do so, whereas under
the NIL the contract only runs in favor of any subsequent indorser
28 6
who may be compelled to pay.

Under both the UCC and the NIL indorsers are liable to one
another in the order in which they indorse, which under the UCC is
presumed to be the order in which their signatures appear on the instrument. Parole evidence is admissible to show that in fact they indorsed in a different order or that they otherwise agreed as to their
28 7
liability to one another.
By an indorsement without recourse the indorser makes no contract of indorsement, that is, he does not engage to pay if the instrument is dishonored, 288 and he warrants that he has no knowledge of any
defense by any party good as against him. 289 The other warranties are
the same.
Under UCC 3-414 relating to contracts of indorsement it would

seem that words similar in meaning to "without recourse" are sufficient, but under the warranty section, UCC 3-417 (3), there is no provision for words of similar meaning. It is not clear whether this difference is intentional or not.
3. Accommodation Party. Under the UCC "An accommodation
part)' is one who signs the instrument in any capacity as surety for
2'Cf. UCc 3-413(2) with NIL 61 (Va. § 6-413).
-Cf. UCC 3-414 with NIL 66 (Va. § 6-418 ) , last sentence. Accord: Shepherd v.

Mortgage Securities Corp. 139 Va. 274, 123 S. E. 553 (1924).
-'Cf. UCC 3-414(l) with NIL 66 (Va. § 6-418).
2TCf. UCC 3-414(2) with NIL 68 (Va. § 6-420). Accord: Mann v. Bradshaw's Adm'r,
136 Va. 351, 118 S. E. 326 (1923); Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, oo S. E. 666 (1919);
Alphin v. Lowman, 115 Va. 441, 79 S. E. 1029 (1913) (agreement as to liability not
within Statute of Frauds).
2Cf.UCC 3-414(1) with NIL 38 (Va. § 6-396) and NIL 65 (Va. § 6-417).
mUCC 3-417(3).
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another party to it."290 By using the word "surety" the UCC recognizes that accommodation parties are always sureties and may be
compensated. Under the NIL the accommodation party must sign
the instrument "without ieceiving value therefore." 291 The UCC endeavors to incorporate the entire background of the law of suretyship
as applied to negotiable instruments. 292 This view of the UCC would
affect the reasoning of the Virginia court in Barrett v. Vaughan &
Co.,293 in which it was said that an indorser guaranteeing payment on an
instrument, "has voluntarily made himself primarily liable thereon,
hence the question of whether time was extended to the makers is immaterial." 294
Under the language of the UCC the party accommodated must
also be a party to the instrument in order for there to be an accommodation party. This probably is not necessary under the language of
the NIL.2 95 The effect of the change on such a case as Wilson v. Stowers296 is not clear. In this case Stowers, as maker, gave a note payable to
Wilson, as payee, for the accommodation of Dutton, who was not a
party to the instrument. The Virginia Court held that Stowers was
liable to Wilson on the note as an accommodation party under NIL
29 (Va. Sec. 6-881), consideration having moved from Wilson to
Dutton. Under the UCC it would seem that Stowers could not be
treated as an accommodation party since Dutton, the party accommodated, was not a party to the instrument. Want of consideration
under the UCC is a defense against any person not having the rights
of a holder in due course and "consideration" refers to what the
obligor has received for his obligation. 297 From Stowers' standpoint,
then, there was no consideration and he has a valid defense if Wilson,
the payee, is not a holder in due course. Since under the UCC a payee
may be a holder in due course if the instrument is taken for value, in
good faith, and without notice, it may be that Wilson is a holder in
mUCC 3-415(l).
"NIL 29 (Va. § 6-381).
-'UCC 3-415, Comment, Point i.Accord: Ward v. Bank of Pocahontas, 167
Va. 169, 187 S. E. 491 (1936). Under suretyship law a failure or delay in resorting
to collateral security available to holder does not discharge an indorser. See Va.
§ 49-25 under which a "surety, guarantor or endorser" may require a creditor to
take action.
n3163 Va. 811, 178 S. E. 64 (1935).
11
1d. at 818. The result of the case, however, would be the same since it appears that the indorser had also agreed to extensions of time.
'NIL 29 (Va. § 6-381).
M16i Va. 418, 170 S.E. 745 (1933).
IUCC 3-4o8 and Comment, Point 1.
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due course. The consideration moving from Wilson to Dutton would
constitute value; he took the instrument in good faith; and so the
principal question is whether he took the instrument without notice
of a defense.2 98 Answering the question of whether or not Wilson took
the instrument with notice of a defense necessarily involves circuitous
reasoning in which the premise assumed will dictate the conclusion.
If Stowers has a defense, then Wilson has notice of it and is not a
holder in due course, and so the defense is good. If Stowers does not
have a defense, then Wilson does not have notice of a defense and is
a holder in due course, and the defense is not good.
With the difference already noted, the UCC like the NIL provides,
that when an instrument is taken for value before it is due the accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed,
even though the taker knows of the accommodation. 299 Consideration
is not necessary to the contract of an accommodation party.300 An indorsement not in the chain of title is notice, under the UCC, of its
accommodation character;30 ' an accommodation party is not liable
to the party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument he has a right
of recourse against the party accommodated.3 02 With these provisions
in the Code, NIL 64 (Va. Sec. 6-416) relating to the liability of an
irregular indorser is eliminated.
Section 3-415(3) of the UCC seems to change the rule in Virginia

that parole evidence is inadmissible to show accommodation as against
a party who did not know of the accommodation at the time he took
the instrument. 03 But the precise nature of the change is not clear
because of the ambiguity with which the UCC provision is phrased.
This section of the UCC provides:
"As against a holder in due course and without notice of the
accommodation, oral proof of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges
-"UCC3-302 (1) and (2).

"Cf. UCC 3-415(2) with NIL 29 (Va. § 6-381). Accord: Colona v. Parksley
National Bank, 12o Va. 812, 92 S. E. 979 (1917).
31Accord: Ward v. Bank of Pocahontas, 167 Va. 169, 187 S. E. 491 (1936); Wilson v. Stowers, 161 Va. 418, 17o S. E. 745 (1933)3'UCC 3-415(4).
3UCC 3-415(5). This provision is intended to change the result of such cases

as Quimby v. Varnum, 19o Mass. 211, 76 N. E. 671 (i9o6), which held that the accommodation party had no rights on the instrument against the accommodated
party since he had no former rights to which to be remitted under NIL 121 (Va.
§6-474).
mElswick v. Combs, 171 Va. 112, 198 S. E. 5ol (1938); Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va.
656, ioo S. E. 666 (1919).
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dependent on his character as such. In other cases the accommodation character may be shown by oral proof."
The only reference to this subsection in the Comment states that
"Under subsection (3) except as against a holder in due course without notice of the accommodation, parol evidence is admissible to
prove that the party has signed for accommodation. 30 4 If this is what
the text of the UCC section means, it would seem that the language "to
give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent
on his character as such" is unnecessary and confusing. As worded, the
phrase in the second sentence, "in other cases" is very ambiguous.
(a) It may refer to cases in which parol evidence is sought to be introduced against a party other than the one designated in the first
sentence (holder in due course without notice of the accommodation),
or (b) it may refer to cases in which parol evidence is sought to be
introduced for a purpose other than that listed in the first sentence
(to secure benefit of discharge dependent on status as accommodition
party), or (c) it may refer to cases involving the use of parol evidence
against a person and for a purpose other than those referred to in
the first sentence. These ambiguities are illustrated by the facts in the
Virginia case of Elswick v. Combs. 05 The receiver of an insolvent
bank held notes signed by T. C. Elswick and indorsed by Gusta Elswick, his wife, and B. E. Elswick, their son; the opinion does not disclose who was named as payee in the notes. The Elswicks endeavored
to set-off a deposit belonging to Gusta against liability on the note.
Under Virginia law the deposit of an indorser cannot be set-off
against the liability of a solvent maker, unless the indorser is the
principal debtor, with the maker an accommodation party. The Virginia court held that parol evidence was inadmissible to show a relationship of the parties other than that disclosed by the instrument,
unless the holder took the instrument knowing of the accommodation. Under the UCC, on these facts, it would seem that parol evidence
would be admissible to establish the defense if the UCC section is interpreted as in (a) above, but it would not be admissible if interpreted
as in (b) or (c) above, since the benefit of the discharge does not depend on the character of an accommodation party as such. This is,
of course, assuming that the bank is not a holder in due course, which
under the UCC it might be even though named as payee in the note.
The section, when read in conjunction with UCC 3-305 on the
rights of a holder in due course distinguishes between two types of
3"UCC

3-415, Comment, Point i.

0171 Va. 112, 198 S. E. 5oi (1938).
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holders in due course; those who take with notice and those who take
without notice that there is an accommodation party on the instrument. The former are subjected to "suretyship" defenses and the latter
are not. Notice of the accommodation received after the instrument
is acquired by a holder in due course is apparently without effect.
Such an interpretation brings the section into conflict with Va. Code
Secs. 49-25 and 49-26, under which a "surety, guarantor or endorser" may require a creditor to take action within fifteen days
against the principal debtor and prosecute it with due diligence or
forfeit his rights against such "surety, guarantor or indorsor."
The provision contained in UCC 3-415 probably leaves unchanged the result in Cox v. Hagan,3 0 6 but the situation seems not to
be explicitly covered in the Code. In Cox v. Hagan, it would appear,
several makers signed a note, some of them for the accommodation
of others. Hagan then signed as accommodation indorser, not knowing
some of the makers were accommodation parties. Hagan paid the
note and brought action against the accommodation parties. The Virginia court held that parol evidence was inadmissible to show the
accommodation character of the maker's signatures since the plaintiff did not know of it. The court did not indicate whether the result
would have been different if the plaintiff had known of the accommodation.
UCC 3-415(2), providing that the accommodation party is liable in

the capacity in which he has signed "even though the taker knows
of the accommodation," does not seem to apply since Hagan, as accommodation indorser, was not a "taker." UCC 3-414(2), relating to
the order of liability of indorsers, is not applicable since the accommodition maker is not an indorser. UCC 3-415(5), which provides that an

accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and,
if he pays, has a right to recourse against such party, is not entirely
apropos since an accommodation maker is hardly the "party accommodated."
Contract of Guarantor.The UCC makes explicit provision for the
contract of a guarantor on a negotiable instrument,3 07 whereas the
NIL is silent with respect thereto. Words of guaranty added to the
signature of a sole maker or acceptor do not affect his liability, but
added to the signature of one of two or more makers or acceptors creates
a presumption that the signature is for accommodation of the others.
0125 Va. 656, ioo S. E. 666 (1919).
6
*UCC 3-41 .
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When words of guaranty are used by a party it is not necessary to
take the steps of diligence to charge him. By using "Payment guaranteed" or similar words a signer engages to pay without resort by
the holder to any other party.30s The words "Collection guaranteed"
or their equivalent mean that the signer will pay only after the holder
has reduced his claims to judgment and execution has been returned
unsatisfied, or the maker or acceptor is insolvent, or it is otherwise
apparent that it is useless to proceed against him.
ADDENDUM
Since this article was put in type the American Law Institute's
Enlarged Editorial Board has issued Supplement No. 1 (January, 1955)
which recommends amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code.
These amendments require the following significant changes in this
article
i. The consent of the maker, at the time, to an extension of time
by the holder is no longer required. 3-118(f). See pp. 12-13.
2. Negotiability is not affected by a promise "or power to maintain
or protect collateral" or to give additional collateral. 3-112(c). See p. 16.
3. The policy of the NIL permitting a holder to convert a blank
into a special indorsement continues unchanged. 3-204(3). See p. 28.
4. Restrictive indorsements have been added and defined as
including conditional indorsements and those for the benefit or account
of the indorser or another person. Liability is imposed, for mishandling
instruments restrictively indorsed, or any transferee or payor, except an
intermediary bank or a payor that is not a depositary bank. 3-205, 3-2o6,
3-304. See pp. 27-30, 37-38.
5. Observance of reasonable commercial standards as an aspect
of taking in good faith has been eliminated. 3-302, 3-4o6. See pp. 31,
34, 496.The provision under which transfers that are preferences may
give notice of claims against the instrument has been eliminated.
3-304(2). See p. 36.
7. See report of Sub-Committee on Article 3 for an interpretation of
3-307 relating to defenses and due course holding that would change
Virginia law. Supplement No. i at pp. 115-5. See p. 45.

mAccord: Barrett v. Vaughan & Co., 163 Va. 811, 178 S. E. 64 (1935).
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